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RACIAL AND ETHNIC GROUP 
DEFAMATION: A SPEECH-FRIENDLY 
PROPOSAL 
MICHAEL]' POLELLE* 
Abstract: In AIDA v. Time Warner Entertainment Company, currently 
before the Illinois Supreme Court, the American Italian Defense 
Association (AIDA) alleges that the television series 'The Sopranos" 
portrays the criminal and psychopathically depraved character of the 
Mafia underworld as the dominant motif of Italian and Italian-
American culture. The author, drawing upon his experience as co-
counsel to AIDA, submits that the law should provide a remedy for 
racial and ethnic group defamation. It is paradoxical for the law to only 
allow a remedy for individual defamation. The current civil damage 
lawsuit for defamation is inapplicable because courts consistently deny 
damages for group defamation by refusing to recognize the individual 
harm caused by group defamation. Likewise, criminal defamation 
statutes are now found in fewer than half the states and rarely used by 
prosecutors. This Article proposes enacting a declaratory judgment 
statute at the state level to remedy group racial and ethnic defamation. 
This suggested remedy takes the form of model legislation in the 
Appendix to this Article. 
I'm in the process oj dealing with these Guido motherJuckers. 
-Will Smith, in ENEMY OF THE STATE (Touchstone Pictures 1998) 
INTRODUCTION 
Freedom of speech and freedom from racial and ethnic dis-
crimination are two fundamental values in American society that stem 
from both democratic governance and a population of increasingly 
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diverse racial and ethnic groups. As the United States shifts symboli-
cally from a melting pot to a mosaic, the necessity of respect for all 
racial and ethnic groups takes on increasing importance. Social har-
mony depends on peaceful co-existence and respect while at the same 
time, the spirit of open discussion and public debate remains an es-
sential part of our constitutional heritage. 
This Article proposes that the law should provide a remedy for 
racial and ethnic defamation because it is paradoxical for the law to 
allow a remedy for individual defamation but no effective remedy for 
group defamation. In Only Words, Professor MacKinnon attacks the 
distinction between a recovery for individual defamation but not for 
group defamation by pointing out that the distinction is in conflict 
with our equal-protection jurisprudence. l When a discriminatory act 
is involved, courts readily perceive that an invidiously discriminatory 
attack on a racial or ethnic group affects everyone within the group. 
In such cases, courts readily accept that the individual is only injured 
precisely because of his or her affiliation with a racial or ethnic group, 
unlike the group-defamation scenario.2 To rigidly distinguish individ-
ual harm in such cases from group harm would be the equivalent of 
always considering crimes as isolated facts in a criminal law context 
and never as part of a group conspiracy despite any evidence to the 
contrary. An individual's social autonomy or subordination is inextri-
cably linked to the mass stereotype of the individual's racial or ethnic 
group. 
The suggested remedy for group racial and ethnic defamation, 
which takes the detailed form of model legislation in the Appendix to 
this Article, is a declaratory judgment procedure. This procedure 
avoids the constitutional and policy problems of monetary damages, 
injunctive relief, or criminal penalties. Furthermore, it reflects the 
reality that the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), apply-
ing a laissez-faire ethic, is increasingly unwilling to regulate the elec-
tronic media. The need for a remedy arises because classic counter-
speech as a remedy is largely illusory in an age of multi-billion-dollar 
media megacorporations which are on the verge of becoming the 
media landlords of the marketplace of ideas. 
1 See generally CA'IHARINE A. MACKINNON, ONLY WORDS (1993). 
2 Id. at 51-52. MacKinnon also makes the point that "does any Black man doubt, upon 
encountering 'Nigger Die' at work, that it means him?" Id. at 52. Justice Frankfurter rec-
ognized that a legislature could rationally determine that individuals are socially affected 
for better or worse by the reputation of the racial group to which they belong. Beauharnais 
v. lliinois, 343 U.S. 250, 263 (1952). 
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I. AIDA v. TIME WARNER ENTERTAINMENT COMPANY 
The genesis of this Article is the author's experience as co-
counsel for the American Italian Defense Association (AIDA) in a civil 
action filed in the Chancery Division of the Circuit Court of Cook 
County, Illinois against Time Warner Entertainment Company, L.P., a 
subsidiary of AOL Time Warner Entertainment Company, for viola-
tion of Article I, Section 20 of the Illinois Constitution (en titled "Indi-
vidual Dignity"). AIDA claimed that Time Warner's distribution 
through Home Box Office (HBO) of The Sopranos, a cable television 
miniseries, in whole or part violated this section of the Illinois Consti-
tution. AIDA filed its lawsuit solely for a declaratory judgment, with-
out any ancillary request for damages or injunctive relief.3 
Article I, Section 20 of the state Bill of Rights provides: "To pro-
mote individual dignity, communications that portray criminality, de-
pravity or lack of virtue in, or that incite violence, hatred, abuse or 
hostility toward, a person or group of persons by reason of or by ref-
erence to religious, racial, ethnic, national or regional affiliation are 
condemned."4 The prototype for this constitutional provision was an 
Illinois criminal libel statute that had punished publication or por-
trayals of "depravity, criminality, unchastity, or lack of virtue of a class 
of citizens of any race, color, creed or religion." The United States 
Supreme Court in Beauharnais v. Illinois upheld the constitutionality 
of this statute in affirming a $200 fine against Beauharnais for distrib-
uting leaflets which attributed criminal proclivities to Mrican-
Americans.5 Imputations of criminality are one of the most common 
3 Complaint for Declaratory Judgment 1: 1, AIDA v. Time Warner Entm't Co., No. 
01CH05819 (Cir. Ct. Cook County Ill. filed Apr. 5, 2001). 
4 ILL. CONST. art. 1, § 20. Victor Arrigo, the sponsor of Article I, Section 20, indicated 
his motivation for sponsorship in the legislative history: 
As an American of Italian descent, I can speak with authority on this carci-
noma of the soul that I became acquainted with at the age of twelve when I 
was stopped by a policeman on my way home from a public library branch 
with two books under my arm. The greeting was, "Hey, Wop, where did you 
swipe those books?" This was immediately followed by a kick in the backside 
and the parting remark, "Don't tell me you Dagos are now learning to read," 
when I showed him the library card and tried to prove my innocence of any 
wrongdoing in my possession of the books. The trauma of that experience 
and the feeling of degradation that followed has been a deeply engrained 
memory that has remained with me since. 
SIXTII ILL. CONST. CONVENTION, VERBATIM TRANSCRIPTS, No. 65, at 1637-38 (1970), re-
printed in RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS, SIXTII ILLINOIS CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, VER-
BATIM TRANSCRIPTS 1637-38 (John W. Lewis 1972). 
5343 U.S. at 251-52,266,267. 
216 Boston College Third World Law Journal [Vol. 23:213 
categories of defamation.6 In addition to being defamatory, imputa-
tions of a criminal offense historically have been considered as slan-
der per se because of their serious threat to reputation and, therefore, 
do not require proof of special damage. 7 
The AIDA complaint alleged that the Individual Dignity Clause 
of the Illinois Bill of Rights was violated in that one or more episodes 
of The Sopranos portrayed the criminal and psychopathically depraved 
character of the Mafia underworld as the dominant motif of Italian 
and Italian-American culture.s AIDA's contention was that the Italian-
American characters in The Sopranos were almost unanimously por-
trayed as lacking in civility, respectability, or virtue, or as condoning 
Mafia attitudes and misdeeds, even when they were not directly por-
trayed as Mafia members. More specifically, the complaint alleged that 
a particular episode of The Sopranos represen ted either expressly or by 
implication that criminality is "genetical" [sic] or in the blood of Ital-
ian-Americans.9 The filing of the lawsuit generated a controversial 
public debate about the merits of either The Sopranos or the lawsuit, 
and as a result, the author made a number of media appearances. 
It must be emphasized that without the lawsuit, the author and 
representatives of AIDA, as this Article will show, would have had no 
effective access to the marketplace of ideas in daring to criticize a 
show as well-advertised as The Sopranos and a media enterprise as 
dominant as Time Warner Entertainment Company. AIDA, a not-for-
profit corporation, had a membership just over one hundred persons 
at the time the lawsuit was filed. It was organized for charitable pur-
poses and specifically for the education of the public regarding the 
social contributions of Italian immigrants and "the opposition by law-
ful means of all forms of negative stereotyping, and defamation of 
6 BRUCE W. SANFORD, LIBEL AND PRIVACY § 4.12, at 129-30 (2d ed. 1999). 
7 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 571 (1977). Claim of "alleged mob ties" was 
enough for defamation. Bufalino v. Associated Press, 692 F.2d 266, 269 (2d Cir. 1982); see 
also Clemente v. Espinosa, 749 F. Supp. 672,677 (E.D. Pa. 1990). However, statement that 
plaintiff had "mob connections" and would "order a hit" on defendant does not impute 
that plaintiff in fact committed any crimes for slander per se, even though the words may be 
obviously defamatory. Biondi v. Nassimos, 692 A.2d 103, 107-08 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 
1997) ("It is not uncommon for the mass media to report that an entertainer or other 
celebrity has 'mob ties' or 'mob connections.'"). In states equating libel per se to the slan-
der per se categories, an imputation of a crime likewise does not require proof of special 
damage. See, e.g., Bryson v. News America Publ'ns, Inc., 672 N.E. 2d 1207, 1214-15 (Ill. 
1996); Kevorkian v. AMA, 602 N.W.2d 233, 237 (Mich. Ct. App. 1999). 
8 See Complaint 113, AIDA (No. 01CH05819). 
9 Seeid. 1 13(d). 
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Italian Americans. ,,10 On the other hand, the defendant, Time Warner 
Entertainment Company, held consolidated assets of $85 billion as of 
December 31, 2001. It is also a subsidiary of AOL Time Warner, the 
world's largest provider of Internet services and the world's leading 
media and entertainment company, with over $208 billion in consoli-
dated assets. Time Warner Entertainment Company's cable network 
business involves chiefly its ownership and management of the HBO 
Division, the nation's most widely distributed pay television service. 
HBO, together with its sister service, Cinemax, accounted for about 
38.1 million subscribers as of December 31, 2001.11 
HBO is known for the exhibition of pay television original movies 
and especially for the television series known as The Sopranos. There is 
no doubt that The Sopranos has been both popular and widely ac-
claimed by a number of media critics,12 But the passing popularity of 
racial or ethnic depiction says little or nothing about the stereotypical 
or defamatory nature of the depiction. The Birth of a Nation, for ex-
ample, originally entitled The Clansman, was acclaimed as a cinematic 
masterpiece and its creator, D.W. Griffith, was seen as a visionary film 
artist when the film was released in 1915, even though the film de-
picted Mrican-Americans as villains and the Ku Klux Klan as the 
South's savior,13 Despite street protests and opposition by the NAACP 
due to the racist and stereotypical nature of this popular movie, the 
Directors Guild of America continued to bestow the "D.W. Griffith 
Award" upon twenty-eight directors for distinguished motion picture 
direction from 1953 until 1999, when the award was finally retired be-
cause of its unsavory connection to racial stereotyping.14 
Without expressly deciding any First Amendment issue, the 
Chancery Division of the Circuit Court of Cook County granted the 
motion of Time Warner Entertainment Company to dismiss the com-
10 Id. " 2, 4. 
11 AOL TIME WARNER INC., SEC FORM 10-K 17, F-27, F-11O, at http://www. 
sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1105705/000095013002001845/d1Ok405.htm. 
12 The Sopranos has received four Emmy Awards, a George Foster Peabody Award, three 
Screen Actors Guild Awards, and three Golden Globe Awards. The show is the only televi-
sion show to become part of the Museum of Modern Art's permanent video collection. The 
Washington Post hailed the show as "one of the greatest pieces of auteurist television ever 
produced" and the New York Times called it "the greatest work of American popular culture 
in the past quarter century." See Motion to Dismiss at 3, 4, AIDA v. Time Warner Entm't 
Co., No. 01CH05819 (Crr. Ct. Cook County Ill. filed May 21,2001). 
1~ DAVID M. CHALMERS, HOODED AMERICANISM: THE HISTORY OF 'IHE Ku KLux KLAN 
6,25-26 (3d ed. 1987). 
14 David Robb, Showcase: Directors Drop Griffith Award, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Dec. 16, 1999, at 
59. 
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plaint with prejudice. The court granted the motion both on the basis 
that AIDA lacked standing, even though the company never raised 
the issue, and on the more fundamental basis that the legislative his-
tory of Article I, Section 20 proved this section of the lllinois Bill of 
Rights was "purely hortatory" and merely a "constitutional sermon," 
without any legal meaning or effect. 15 On June 28, 2002, the lllinois 
Appellate Court affirmed the dismissal of the complaint on the 
ground that AIDA lacked standing to assert the claim and on the 
ground that the Individual Dignity Clause of Article I, Section 20 was 
purely hortatory. The case is now before the lllinois Supreme Court 
on a petition for leave to appeal. 16 
II. THE GROUP HARM OF RACIAL AND ETHNIC STEREOTYPING 
The following section summarizes the modern development of 
mass media by the Nazis as a tool of stereotypical indoctrination and 
social manipulation. Studies have indicated that the mass media does 
have an impact on the way ethnic and racial groups are perceived, 
even in democratic states. Because of the horrific effects of Nazi racist 
propaganda, both contemporary national and international laws have 
condemned and punished group defamation based on race and eth-
nicity. Aside from the significant exception of the United States, ma-
jor democratic nations have seen no conflict between freedom of ex-
pression and a prohibition against speech that incites racial or ethnic 
hatred or that defames a racial or ethnic group. Like other immigrant 
groups, Italian Americans have been stereotyped and discriminated 
against. Contrary to fact, the Italian-American has become the crimi-
nal archetype of contemporary American society through the power 
of the mass media. 
A. A Brief History of Racial and Ethnic Stereotyping 
and Current &cognition of the Harm 
It is a cultural commonplace that Nazi Germany used the de-
famatory art of racial and ethnic stereotyping to make the imprison-
ment and death of Jews acceptable to public opinion. Generations of 
stereotyping existed, thus laying the groundwork even before Nazis 
arrived on the scene. Going back to the Middle Ages, the so-called 
15 AIDA v. Time Warner Entm't Co., No. 01CH5819, slip op. at 4, 6 (Cir. Ct. Cook 
County Ill. Sept. 19, 2001). 
16 AIDA v. Time Warner Entm't Co., 772 N.E.2d 953, 960 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002), appeal 
denied by 202 Ill. 2d 597 (Ill. 2002). 
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"blood libel" spread that gentile blood was necessary for the baking of 
Passover matzah. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, anti-
Semitic political groups in Eurore used this defamatory myth to jus-
tify their prejudice against Jews.! The Protocols of the Elders of Zion was a 
tract, probably concocted by the Czarist secret police, to circulate a 
fabricated account of a Jewish plot to take over the world. Since 1920 
more than one hundred editions, reprints, and new versions of this 
ethnic attack have appeared in the English-speaking world. The Nazis 
admired Henry Ford for his endorsement of the views in this pam-
phlet, even though Ford later recanted under pressure of a libel law-
suit.!8 
Building on this history of group defamation, the Nazis used the 
new technology of film to dehumanize Jews in the cinemas of Ger-
many. The best example of this genre of group vilification is a classic 
propaganda film cleverly crafted in a documentary style, which de-
picted Jews as a plague spreading across the world. The film drew an 
explicit parallel between rats and Jews, as the camera panned to a 
pack of swarming rats.!9 Adolf Hitler provided the psychological in-
sight for the effectiveness of group libel based on racial or ethnic ori-
gin by the concept of the "big lie. "20 In Mein Kampf, Hitler adopted 
the principle that a "big lie" is more effective than a petty lie, explain-
ing that a nation's masses are more easily taken in by big lies because 
they find it difficult to believe that anyone would be impudent 
enough to fabricate on such a massive scale.21 Even when facts are 
17 THE BLOOD LIBEL LEGEND: A CASEBOOK IN ANTI-SEMITIC FOLKLORE 233 (Alan 
Dundes ed., 1991). Even now the blood libel persists. The editor of a Saudi newspaper 
apologized for several articles that described Jews as "vampires who bake cookies with the 
blood of nonjews" and a people admonished by the Torah to eat "pastries mixed with 
human blood." Donna Abu-Nasr, Saudi Editor Retracts Anti-Semitic Articles, CHI. ThIB., Mar. 
21,2002, § 1, at 10. 
18 BINJAMIN W. SEGEL, A LIE AND A LIBEL: THE HISTORY OF TIlE PROTOCOLS OF TIlE 
ELDERS OF ZION 25-27 (Richard S. Levy ed. & trans., 1995). 
19 See DER EWIGE JUDE [ThE ETERNAL JEW] (UFA 1940). Another film depicted a 
grasping Jewish financier who is publicly executed. SeeJuD Suss [Suss TIlEJEW] (1940). A 
defamation-by-association film of Jews being deloused was titled,Juden, Lause, Wanzen Uews, 
Lice. Bugs]. SeeJuDEN, LAUSE. WAN ZEN UEWS, LICE. BUGS] (1941). The use of such propa-
ganda extended to the Balkans. where a film portrayed aJew who raped his servant and 
caused her death from an abortion and Jews who sold Croatian girls into Mideast slavery. 
See KAKO SE S'IVARAJU IZLOBE [How TO MAKE AN EXHIBITION] (Havatsk Slikopsis 1942). 
20 ADOLPH HITLER, MEIN KAMPF 231-32 (Ralph Mannheirn trans., Houghton Mifflin 
1999) (1925). 
21 See id. at 231. Although Hitler projects use of the "big lie" onto the Jews. he clearly 
endorses it as a "sound principle." !d. 
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marshaled to counter the big lie, an aura of truth still lingers around 
the lie.22 
No reasonable person would suggest that the racial and ethnic 
malevolence shown by the Nazi media toward the Jews in the pursuit 
of political objectives exists in the United States. Even though an evil 
ideology does not motivate American media interests as it did in Nazi 
Germany, the American electronic media nonetheless exert a power-
ful influence on the perception of Americans. One advertising study 
of the psyche of the American public found that television holds "an 
absolutely central place in people's lives," with 68% of the national 
sample finding more pleasure and satisfaction in watching 1V than in 
bein~ with friends, helping others, taking vacations, or pursuing hob-
bies. 3 The study found television to be the prime method of unwind-
ing in America, surpassing relaxation, vacations, music, or reading.24 
Ninety-nine percent of American homes are equipped with television; 
the average television is on for over seven hours per day.25 The mil-
lions spent by advertisers attest to the belief that the media affects 
personal attitudes toward products and services. It is unlikely that the 
media have no similar effect on racial and ethnic perceptions.26 
Recognizing the harm of perpetuating these stereotypes, interna-
tional law provides that racial or ethnic group defamation and com-
22 Id. at 231-32. The judicial distrust of group defamation is based on the assumption 
that the larger the group, the less likely a third person would rationally understand the 
defamation to refer to a particular person. But one court has noted that this psychological 
assumption, which isolates an individual from the group with which he or she is identified, 
has been challenged on the basis that when a third person thinks irrationally by harboring 
pre-existing prejudice against a group, the subsequent group defamation reinforces the 
prejudice, regardless of group size. Brady v. Ottaway Newspapers, Inc., 445 N.Y.S.2d 786, 
788 n.2 (N.Y. App. Div. 1981). 
25 D'ARcy MASIUS BENTON & BOWLES, INC., FEARS & FANTASIES OF '!HE AMERICAN 
CONSUMER: AN AMERICAN CONSUMER REpORT 34 (1986) (reporting the next highest cate-
gory-being with friends-at 61 %). The study was performed by mail, using the Con-
sumer Panel of the advertising firm D'Arey Masius Benton & Bowles, Inc. The panel con-
sisted of 4,000 households, divided into four separate panels of 1000 households each, 
with each panel representative of U.S. households. Id. at 4. 
24 Id. at 35 (reporting the next highest category-just relaxing-at 60%). Watching 
television is the most popular way to spend an evening-three times more popular than 
spending time with friends-according to a more recent television survey. Power in Your 
Hand, ECONOMIST, Apr. 13, 2002, at 3. 
25 WILLIAM F. BAKER & GEORGE DESSART, DOWN '!HE TuBE: AN INSIDE AcCOUNT OF 
'!HE FAILURE OF AMERICAN TELEVISION, at xiv (1998). 
26 See MICHAEL PARENTI, INVENTING REALITY 10-13 (1986) (contending that the news 
media distort public perceptions of race, class, and gender). 
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munications that foment racial hatred are not protected speech.27 Ar-
ticle 4 of the International Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Racial Discrimination considers group defamation a cate-
gorical exception to the right of free expression.28 Furthermore, a 
number of nations have found laws restricting racial hatred and 
group defamation to be compatible with their democratic principles 
of governmen t. By use of a criminal code amended in 1960, Germany 
makes it a criminal offense to insult a group of fgeople or to mali-
ciously cause the group to be vilified or defamed. 9 Since the 1970s, 
France has extensively applied laws, both civilly and criminally, pro-
hibiting racial incitement, group libel, and racial injury.30 
Even nations that share the common law tradition with the 
United States, such as Great Britain, Canada, India, and Nigeria, pro-
hibit defamatory speech affecting racial groups. Each nation typically 
requires a mens rea of one sort or another, probably because these 
regulations are found in the penal laws of each of the four common 
law nations.31 In Regina v. Keegstra, the Canadian Supreme Court up-
held the validity of a statute that punished the defendant for dissemi-
nating hate propaganda.32 The defendant, Keegstra, had called Jews 
27 THOMAS DAVID JONES, HUMAN RIGHTS: GROUP DEFAMATION, FREEDOM OF EXPRES-
SION AND '!HE LAW OF NATIONS 38-40, 42 (1998) ("Group defamation is illegal conduct at 
international law, and it is punishable as a crime under the laws of the majority of nations 
in the world."). 
28Id. at 39. The United States is one of 165 signatories to the Convention. See generally 
UNITED NATIONS, OFFICE OF '!HE UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN 
RIGHTS, STATIJS OF RATIFICATIONS OF THE PRINCIPAL INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 
TREATIES (2002), at http://www.unhchr.ch/report.pdf. 
29 UNDER '!HE SHADOW OF WEIMAR: DEMOCRACY, LAw AND RACIAL INCITEMENT IN SIX 
COUNTRIES 87 (Louis Greenspan & Cyril Levitt eds., 1993). 
lID Id. at 48-49. A 1990 reform makes it a criminal offense to deny the Nazi genocide of 
the jews. Id. at 56. A federal court has held that the First Amendment bars enforcement in 
the United States of a French court order seeking to compel Yahool to either prevent its 
French subscribers from viewing Nazi memorabilia or pay a fine of $13,000 per day. Ya-
hool, Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme et L'Antisemetisme, 169 F. Supp. 2d 1181, 1184-
85,1193 (N.D. Cal. 2001). 
51 Thomas David jones, Human Rights: Freedom of Expression and Group Defamation Under 
British, Canadian, Indian, Nigerian and United States Law-A Comparative Analysis, 18 SUF-
FOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REv. 427, 428-31 (1995). 
52 [1990] S.C.R. 697, 713, 782 (Can.); see MACKINNON, supra note 1, at 99. ("We ar-
gued that group defamation is a verbal form inequality takes, that just as white supremacy 
promotes inequality on the basis of race, color, and sometimes ethnic or national origin, 
an ti-Semitism promotes the inequality of jews on the basis of religion and ethnicity."). See 
generally Alan Borovy et aI., james McCormick Mitchell Lecture, Discussion on Language as 
Violence v. Freedom of Expression: Canadian and American Perspectives on Group Defa-
mation (Nov. 4, 1998), in 37 BUFF. L. REv. 337 (1988/1989) (comparing Canadian and 
United States perspectives on group defamation). 
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"money-loving" and "child killers" and claimed that Jews fabricated 
the Holocaust. 
These nations recognize from bitter historical experience, not 
fully shared by the United States, that defamatory racial and ethnic 
stereotypes harm people and can even lead to their destruction. Until 
recently, one might have assumed that the only harm to the stereo-
typed group came from the diminished respect that other groups in 
society had for the stereotyped group. A stereotype, such as that Gyp-
sies are liars and thieves, can permeate a society and result in dimin-
ished cultural, political, and economic opportunities for the stereo-
typed group, which is then invidiously discriminated against by the 
social consequences of stereotypical discourse. 
It is possible, however, that the most insidious harm caused by 
stereotypes is not the diminished respect of others who are taken in 
by the stereotype, but the internalized acceptance of the stereotype by 
the targeted victim. A study found that students taking academic tests 
perform worse if confronted with cultural stereotypes prior to the 
test. 33 This negative result occurred even when the tested group was 
not a racial or ethnic minority chronically targeted by social stereo-
types.34 Referred to by Professor Claude M. Steele, one of the authors 
of the study, as "stereotype threat," this concept encompasses the ex-
tra pressure members of a stereotyped group feel in test situations, 
with the result that the group members, despite their individual abili-
ties, tend to fulfill the stereotyped expectations of how their racial, 
ethnic, or gender group is expected to perform on such tests. To be 
affected by the stereotype the stereo~ed person need not believe the 
stereotype nor even take it personally. 5 
B. The Italian-American Experience: Past Discrimination 
and Current Ethnic Stereotyping 
Like other ethnic groups from southern and eastern Europe, Ital-
ian-Americans have suffered discrimination because of a difference in 
culture and language. The Supreme Court specifically noted in Uni-
versity of California Regents v. Bakke that immigrants from southern, 
middle, and eastern Europe, including Italian-Americans, continued 
" Joshua Aronson, et aI. When White Men Can't Do Math: Necessary and Sufficient Factors 
in Stereotype Threat, 35 J. EXPERIMENTAL Soc. PSYCHOL. 29, 36-37, 39 (1999). 
Sf Id. at 39-40. 
!III Claude M. Steele, A Threat in the Air: How Stereotypes Shape Intellectual Identity and Per-
formance, 52 AM. PSYCHOL. 613, 618 (1997). 
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to be shunned in the upper levels of corporate America because of 
their ethnic origins.36 Another court has recognized that Italian-
Americans in particular suffer from a history of "stereotyping, invidi-
ous ethnic humor and discrimination ... 37 This sometimes led to big-
oted violence against Italian-Americans, such as the lynching of eleven 
Italians in New Orleans in 1891, which remains the largest single 
lynching in United States history.38 
World War II was also a traumatic experience for Italian-
Americans. In the Wartime Violation of Italian-American Civil Liber-
ties Act, Congress found that more than 600,000 Italian immigrants in 
the United States had been branded enemy aliens.39 Government 
measures during the war required these Italian immigrants not only 
to carry identification cards but also to endure travel restrictions and 
seizure of their personal property.40 More than 10,000 immigrants on 
the West Coast were forced to leave their homes and prohibited from 
entering coastal zones solely because of their ethnicity. Although not 
on the same massive scale as Japanese-Americans, thousands of Ital-
ians were arrested and hundreds interned in military camps similar to 
those that housed Japanese-Americans. The full extent of the civil 
rights violations remains unknown, and consequently, Congress has 
ordered the Attorney General to conduct a comprehensive review of 
the treatment ofltalian-Americans by the United States government!} 
Another example of discrimination against Italian-Americans was 
addressed when the chancellor of the City University of New York in-
cluded Italian-Americans as an affirmative action group, because of 
56 438 U.S. 265,292 n.32 (1978). 
57 United States v. Biaggi, 673 F. Supp.96, 101 (E.D.N.V. 1987) (stating that Italian 
Americans constitute a "cognizable group' for Batson challenges), afJ'd, 853 F.2d 89 (2d 
Cir.1988). 
58 RICHARD GAMBINO, VENDETTA: THE TRUE S'IURY OF '!HE LARGEST LYNCHING IN U.S. 
HIS'IURY, at ix (2d ed, Guernica 2000). 
59 Pub. L. No. 106-451, § 2, 114 Stat. 1947 (2000). For further information, Stephen 
Fox provides a rare and excellent account of the wartime restrictions on Italian-Americans 
and on the effect of those restrictions. See STEPHEN Fox, THE UNKNOWN INTERNMENT: AN 
ORAL HIS'IURY OF '!HE RELOCATION OF ITALIAN AMERICANS DURING WORLD WAR II, at xv 
(1990) (noting that accounts of wartime relocation on the West Coast during World War 
II, which have focused completely on the Japanese, provide an incomplete story because 
they ignore the effects of relocation on Italians and Germans). 
40 Wartime Violation of Italian American Civil Liberties Act § 2. 
41 See id. §§ 2, 3. The effect of World War II and the restrictive measures taken against 
Italian-Americans induced a sense of shame in Italian-Americans about their heritage. 
Lawrence Di Stasi, How World War II Iced Italian American Culture, in UNA S'IURIA SEGRETA: 
THE SECRET HIS'IURY OF ITALIAN AMERICAN EVACUATION AND INTERNMENT DURING 
WORLD WAR II, at 306 (Lawrence Di Stasi ed., 2001). 
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the widespread belief that the university discriminated against Italian-
Americans.42 Mter the discovery of evidence that the university had 
discriminated against Italian-Americans, both on an individual and 
class basis, a judge later issued a preliminary injunction, which re-
sulted in a settlement.43 More broadly, judicial precedent indicates 
that Italian-Americans, like other Caucasians, can be considered a 
"race" for purposes ofa civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1981.44 
Nevertheless, the media emits a stream of discriminatory and 
stereotypical Italian-American roles. Given that violence, lust, and 
anti-social characters attract audiences, the temptation exists to find 
the stock "villain" who symbolizes these qualities and whose villainy 
will help attract and keep audiences. In the film Enemy of the State, the 
hero actor, Will Smith, psychologically links the disgusting Mafia 
characters with Italian-Americans by expressly referring to those 
"Guido motherfuckers . ..45 This hardcore ethnic slur is addressed not 
to the criminal element, as would be appropriate, but to the Italian-
American community, with the almost subliminal assumption the two 
concepts are substantially interchangeable. The raised consciousness 
of the film industry would most likely not permit a comparable slur of 
Mrican-Americans, Hispanics, or perhaps any other racial or ethnic 
groUp.46 Given that the celluloid image of the savage Native American 
42 Scelsa v. City Univ. ofN.Y., 806 F. Supp. 1126, 1128 (S.D.N.Y. 1992). 
45Id. at 1131. 
44 See St. Francis Coli. v. Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604, 611 (1987) (stating that encyclope-
dias in the nineteenth century defined race in terms of ethnic groups); see also Shaare 
Tefila Congregation v. Cobb, 481 U.S. 615, 627 (1987) (holding that Jews can state a 
§ 1982 claim of racial discrimination because, at the time the statute was passed, Jews were 
one of the groups considered to be a distinct race). Italian-Americans were specifically 
allowed to sue under 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Bisciglia v. Kenosha Unified Sch. Dist. No.1, 45 
F.3d 223, 230 (7th Cir. 1995); DeSaile v. Key Bank of S. Me., 685 F. Supp. 282,284-85 (D. 
Me. 1988). It appears that a § 1983 claim for violation of equal protection can also be 
raised by an Italian-American if the evidence is sufficient. See Benigni v. City of Hemet, 879 
F.2d 473, 477-78 (9th Cir.1988) (finding that plaintiff had only presented thin evidence of 
discrimination based on his Italian ancestry). 
45 ENEMY OF 'IHE STATE (Touchstone Pictures 1998). "I have argued that the burden 
placed on the Italian immigrants was, in fact, an aspect of American racism, naturalizing 
(as based on a brute fact of race) the structural injustice of abridging basic human rights 
on grounds of dehumanizing stereotypes that arose from that abridgement." DAVID A J. 
RICHARDS, ITALIAN AMERICAN: THE RACIALIZING OF AN E'IHNIC IDENITI'IY 199 (1999). 
46 See, e.g., Celeste Garrett, 1byota to Spend $8 billion to Increase its Diversity, CHI. 1'R.IB., 
Aug. 10, 2001, § 3, at 2 (describing how Toyota pulled an offensive advertisement, showing 
a black man smiling with a gold front tooth highlighted with the shape of Toyota's RAV 4 
sports utility vehicle). In a Tide VII case, however, no valid claim existed, even though the 
Italian-American plaintiff produced affidavits that union managers had stated, "all the 
Italians were going to be fired" and "all the Italians were nothing but mobsters and gang-
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or menacing Mrican-American is no longer politically correct, It IS 
understandable that a less politically cohesive group, such as Italian-
Americans, should be nominated for the role of media villain. The 
forbidden attributes of violence, lust, and criminality projected onto 
the Mafia with a capital M becomes mythologized like the Noble Sav-
age or Childlike Negro and becomes the archetype of the Criminal 
Italian. That fewer than 1 % of Italian-Americans are involved in or-
ganized crime, according to the FBI's own statistics, is irrelevant to a 
media-massaged public perception because racial and ethnic gener-
alizations have a far more powerful hold on public imagination than 
any fact. 47 
One Italian-American academic finds a Faustian bargain made by 
earlier Italian-American immigrants who, unlike Mrican-Americans 
and Jewish-Americans, withdrew from public discourse in exchange 
for being let alone. The early Italian-American immigrants developed 
a sheltered sense of identity that required a low profile, a shedding of 
cultural roots, and social passivity regarding racial and ethnic dis-
crimination in the larger society.48 The poverty of southern Italians 
who came in waves of immigration and the shame of Fascist Italy, at 
war with the United States, triggered an urgency to become more 
American than the Pilgrims and a highly developed defense mecha-
nism of denial in the face of public stereotyping.49 The author recalls 
a respected Italian-American judge with a name that ended in vowel 
who observed during a public lecture how hard it was to get elected 
with a name unlike the "American" name of an Irish-American candi-
date. The irony of this social conditioning is that the names of an-
sters." Indurante v. Local 705, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 160 F.3d 364, 366 (7th Cir. 1998). In 
her dissent, Judge Rovner stated, 
Indeed, I am aware of no case from this circuit suggesting that a remark akin 
to "We're going to fire all of the Blacks," or "We're not going to hire any 
women" would not amount to direct evidence of discrimination solely be-
cause it does not single out the plaintiff for individual mention. 
Id. at 369 n.l (Rovner,]., dissenting). 
47 Mafia membership peaked around five thousand in the 1960s. By 1999 it had 
dropped to about 1,150, with 750 members in New York. The national "commission" of 
mob bosses that resolved mob disputes has not met in twenty years. Rick Hampson, Death of 
the Mob, USA TODAY, July 28, 1999, at lA. Even if all five thousand criminals in the heyday 
of organized crime were hypothetically all Italian-American, that would have constituted 
only .0025% of the estimated 20 million Italian-Americans in the United States. H.R. Con. 
Res. 141, 107th Congo (2001) at 2, available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/ 
z?cl07:H.CON.RES.141:. 
48 See RICHARDS, supra note 45, at 189-90, 193-95. 
49 See id. at 5-8; Di Stasi, supra note 41, at 306-09. 
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other immigrant ethnic group in a multicultural and multiethnic so-
ciety are assumed to be "American" names while one's own name is 
not. Much as other Americans were surprised to find out that Mrican-
Americans were not really happy behind the blackface of another 
generation, it may also surprise some that Italian-Americans are in-
creasingly unwillingly to fatalistically accept their ethnic profiling as 
gangsters. 
In resisting what it felt to be the latest in a barrage of defamatory 
stereotyping of Italian-Americans exemplified by The Sopranos, AIDA 
and its members discovered that the media have a powerful role to 
play in the way racial and ethnic minorities view themselves and are 
viewed by others. The National Italian Foundation commissioned a 
survey by Zogby International to determine the impact of televised 
ethnic stereotyping on teenagers. When asked to identify the role a 
person of a particular ethnic or racial background would most likely 
play in a movie or on television 34.3% said Italian-Americans would 
be cast as crime bosses, the highest percentage of all ethnic stereo-
types.50 The more television these teenagers watched the more likely 
they were to cast Italian-Americans in the role of crime bOSS.51 The 
study concluded that: (1) teens learn the worst parts of their heritage 
from entertainment industry stereotyping; and (2) the perception 
that teens have of other racial, ethnic, or religious groups is shaped by 
entertainment industry stereotypes.52 
Although the results highlighted may be those affecting Italian-
Americans, this is not to deny the stereotyping that occurs with other 
racial and ethnic groups. A respected consortium of medical profes-
sionals has concluded that, with the average American child watching 
television as much as twenty-eight hours a week, well over one thou-
sand studies point overwhelmingly to a causal link between media vio-
lence and aggressive behavior in some children.53 A more recent study 
50 ZOGBY INT'L, 'JEEN SURVEY: 'JESTING '!HE INFLUENCE OF MEDIA ON RACIAL STEREO-
TYPES 16 (2000). 
51 [d. The criminal stereotype of Italian-Americans increases to 44.2% if the 9.9% of 
those who associate Italian-Americans with "gang members" is added to the "crime boss" 
category. See id. The report states. "[T]he National Italian American Federation is then. on 
the right track in trying to lobby for a better image of Italians through protests and in 
school curriculum. although such teachings need to involve families." [d. at 5. 
52 [d. at 4-5. 
55 See AM. AcAD. OF PEDIATRICS ET AL .• JOINT STATEMENT ON '!HE IMPACT OF ENTER-
TAINMENTVIOLENCE ON CHILDREN. CONGRESSIONAL PUBLIC HEAL'!H SUMMIT" 2. 4 (July 
26. 2000). at http://www.aap.org/advocacy/releases/jstmtevc.htm; see also Am. Amuse-
ment Mach. Assoc. v. Kendrick. 115 F. Supp. 2d 943. 987 Exhibit B (S.D. Ind. 2000). 
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found a noteworthy association between the time spent watching tele-
vision and the likelihood of subsequent aggressive acts toward others, 
even when other possible causes were taken into account.54 It is un-
likely that television has any less of an exacerbating affect on racial 
stereotyping. 
Media stereotyping of Italian-Americans and other racial and 
ethnic groups affects not only the next generation, but the current 
one. The Response Analysis Corporation studied the public image of 
Italian-Americans on behalf of the Commission for Social Justice of 
the Order of Sons of Italy in America. Among the negative character-
istics, the most glaring was that 74% of the sample perceived Italian-
Americans as involved with organized crime, far more than attributed 
criminal tendencies to other racial and ethnic groupS.55 This high 
percentage suggests a persistent and emphatic reinforcement of this 
negative stereotype by films, television, depictions, and other mass 
media treatments. Concerned that the media and, specifically, televi-
sion shows like The Sopranos were unfairly damaging the collective 
reputation of 20 million Italian-Americans, the fifth largest ethnic 
group in the United States, Congressional Representative Marge Rou-
kema has sponsored a concurrent resolution of Congress calling on 
the entertainment industry "to stop the negative and unfair stereotyp-
ing of Italian-Americans" and to undertake "an initiative to present 
Italian-Americans in a more balanced and positive manner. ,,56 
Research by the Italic Studies Institute supports this suspected 
connection between the false public stereotype of generalized Italian-
American criminality and the role of the film industry in perpetuating 
that myth. The Image Research Project of the Italic Studies Institute 
surveyed films produced in the United States during the years 1928 
54 Jefferey G. Johnson et aI., Television Viewing and Aggressive Behavior During Adolescence 
and Adulthood, 295 SCI. 2468, 2468 (2002) (assessment over a seventeen-year period with a 
community sample of 707 individuals); see also Craig A. Anderson & Brad]. Bushman, The 
Effects of Media Violence on Society, 295 SCI. 2377, 2377 (2002) ("Despite the consensus 
among experts, lay people do not seem to be getting the message from the popular press 
that media violence contributes to a more violent society.n). 
55 RESPONSE ANALYSIS CORP., AMERICANS OF ITALIAN DESCENT: A STUDY OF PUBLIC 
IMAGES, BELIEFS, AND MIS PERCEPTIONS 5 (Jan. 1991). ("Notice that about three out of 
every four adults make the connection between Italian-Americans and organized crime. 
None of the other groups are associated with this item by more than about one out of four 
adults. n). 
56 H.R. Con. Res. HI, 107th Congo (2001) at I, available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-
bin/query/z?c107:H.CON.RES.141:. 
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through 1999.57 Mter four years of research, the project found a con-
sistently negative portrayal of Italian-Americans and Italian culture in 
74% of the films produced in that period.58 Images of Italian-
Americans as violent criminals predominated in 41 % of the films sur-
veyed, followed closely by 33% of the films in which those of Italian 
heritage are depicted as boors, buffoons, bigots, or socially undesir-
able. Ethnic images that were multifaceted, rather than stereotyped, 
or positive or heroic constituted only 26% of the films.59 The 
influence of The Godfather (1972) was dramatic. Of all Italian mob 
films, only a quarter were produced before 1972, and three quarters 
after The Godfather opened the floodgates of copycat Mafia films. 6o The 
ability of the movie industry to fictionally shape public perceptions of 
an ethnic group is illustrated by a finding of the Institute that from 
1928 through 1999, only 14% of Mafia movies were based on real 
characters or events. The remaining 86% were based on fictionalized 
characters or even ts. 61 
III. COUNTERSPEECH IN A MASS MEDIA MARKETPLACE OF IDEAS 
Defamation occurs when a communication harms the reputation 
of another person so as to lower that person in the estimation of the 
community or as to deter other persons from associating or dealing 
with that person.62 One of the most persistent rationales for freedom 
of speech and press has been the marketplace-of-ideas metaphor in-
voked by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes in the dissenting opinion of 
Abrams v. United States: "[T] he best test of truth is the power of the 
thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market. "63 
57 See generally ITALIC STUD. INST., IMAGE REs. PROJECT, ITALIAN CULTURE ON FILM 
(1928-1999) (1999). 
58 [d. at statement of purpose. 
59 [d. at pie chart labeled "Individual Categories .• 
60 [d. at pie chart labeled "Influence of 'The Godfather. ,. 
61 [d. at pie chart labeled "Mob Movies.· The increasing tendency of Hollywood to 
fictionalize characters and events and the rise of litigation claiming that these fictionalized 
movies distort history and damage reputations is discussed in Richard Willing, Can Holly-
wood handle the truth7, USA TODAY, Jan. 8, 2002, at lA. 
62 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 559 (1977); see Murdock v. Penn., 319 U.S. 105, 
115 (1943) (stating freedom of speech has a preferred position); Chaplinksy v. N.H., 315 
U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942) (stating that lewd, obscene, profane, libelous, insulting, or 
fighting words are not protected speech); JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CON-
STITUTIONAL LAw § 16.7 (4th ed. 1991). 
68 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes,]., dissenting); see also Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 
516,537 (1945) ("'Free trade in ideas' means free trade in the opportunity to persuade to 
action, not merely to describe facts."); LEE C. BOLLINGER, ThE TOLERANT SOCIETY 18 
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AIDA's attempt to negotiate some kind of accommodation with Time 
Warner Entertainment Company, a corporation with consolidated 
assets of $24.8 billion and part of an even larger AOL Time Warner, 
Inc. conglomerate, bordered on the ludicrous. With under two hun-
dred members, AIDA had no bargaining power to insist on any dis-
claimers or clarifications related to the symbolic representation of 
Italian-Americans in The Sopranos. The opportunity of AIDA and simi-
lar citizens' groups to enrich public debate through counterspeech in 
the mass media marketplace is virtually nonexistent. The framers of 
the United States Constitution could not have foreseen the techno-
logical developments and economic barriers to market entry that en-
sure not only that freedom of the press belongs to those who can af-
ford a modern printing press, but also that freedom of speech in the 
electronic media market belongs to those who can buy their own ca-
ble or television system. 
In his now classic work, The System of Freedom of Expression, Profes-
sor Emerson observed even then that the most significant threat to 
freedom of expression was "the overpowering monopoly over the 
means of communication acquired by the mass media.,,64 In 1967, he 
noted that out of 1547 cities with daily newspapers, only sixty-four cit-
ies had a competing daily newspaper, and three huge networks con-
trolled what was seen on television.65 With the exception of ABC, the 
other two major television networks of CBS and NBC were purchased 
by companies with little or no experience in television programming 
and whose executives were unaccustomed to doing business under 
the public-interest limitations of television programming.66 More than 
just newspapers and television are at stake. Six companies now control 
the entirety of American mass media: General Electric, Viacom, Dis-
ney, Bertelsmann, Time Warner, and Rupert Murdoch's News Corpo-
ration.67 Even before AOL's merger with Time Warner, the six had 
(1986) ("[W]ithin the legal community today, the Abrams dissent of Holmes stands as one 
of the central organizing pronouncements for our contemporary vision of free speech."). 
64 ThOMAS I. EMERSON, ThE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 627 (Vintage Books 
1971) (1970); see also Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 390 (1974) (White,]., dis-
senting) ("The communications industry has increasingly become concentrated in a few 
powerful hands operating very lucrative businesses reaching across the Nation and into 
almost every home."). In a case of non-actionable group defamation, the Florida District 
Court of Appeal nonetheless criticized the commercial motivations of television news. See 
Thomas v. Jacksonville Television, Inc., 699 So. 2d 800, 805-06 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997). 
6!5 EMERSON, supra note 64, at 627-28. 
66 BAKER & DESSART, supra note 25, at 27, 138. 
67 BEN H. BAGDIKIAN, ThE MEDIA MONOPOLY, at x (6th ed. 2000). 
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more annual media revenues than the next twenty media firms com-
bined. Now, with the historic merger of the world's largest Internet 
provider AOL and Time Warner, the resulting AOL Time Warner Inc. 
has become a corporation worth $350 billion.68 
Time Warner Entertainment Company, L.P., the defendant in the 
AIDA lawsuit, persuaded the United States Court of Appeals to hasten 
the media consolidation of cable systems and television by striking 
down as arbitrary and capricious the FCC cable/broadcast cross-
ownership rule in Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. Ee.G..69 This rule pro-
hibited a cable television system from carrying the signal of any televi-
sion broadcast station if the cable system owned a broadcast station in 
the same local market. 70 The stage is now set for the consolidation of 
68 Id. 
In 1983,50 companies controlled more than half of the media in the United 
States. On paper at least, a mere 50 companies controlling most of American 
media would seem to be a cause for concern. But today, just 20 years later, the 
number has dropped to six. Six gigantic corporations control the vast major-
ity of television, cable, radio, newspapers, magazines and the most popular 
Internet sites-and consequently, the majority of information, public dis-
course, and even artistic expression-in the United States. We have on our 
hands what one might very well call a "merger epidemic" in the media indus-
try. And like any other epidemic, this is an unhealthy one. 
Hearing on Media Concentration: Before the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science & Transporta-
tion, 107th Congo 14, 5 (2001) (statement of William Baker, President & CEO, Thir-
teen/WNET, New York) , 2001 WL 808314 (citations omitted). Twenty years ago, thousands 
offamily-operated stations dominated cable television. Yochi j. Dreazon et aI., Why the Sud-
den Rise in the Urge to Merge and Form Oligopolies?, WALL ST.j., Feb. 25, 2002, at AI. On No-
vember 18, 2002, a deal made between Comcast and AT&T broadband left three compa-
nies in control of 65% of the cable market. Comcast Prospectus 8-1, at http://www. 
sec.gov I Archivesl edgar I datal 1166691 10001 047469030007691 a21 00239z424b2.htm. By 
comparison, what might happen in the United States if present trends continue is illus-
trated in Italy, where one company, Mediaset, controls about half of the television market. 
Tom Hundley, Italian leadercyes media in Germany, CHI. 1'RIB., Apr. 1, 2002, § 1, at 4. 
69 280 F.3d 1027, 1051 (D.C. Cir. 2002). See generally AIDA v. Time Warner Entm't Co., 
772 N.E.2d 953 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002). 
70 Fox Television Stations, Inc., 280 F.3d at 1035 (additional rule prohibiting any entity 
from controlling TV stations if control resulted in an audience reach beyond 35% of the 
TV households in the United States remanded to FCC for further consideration). The 
former radio-television cross ownership rule generally prohibited joint ownership of a 
radio and television station in the same local market. The new rule permits more joint 
ownership of radio and television stations in the same market than the former "one-to-a-
market" rule. In re Review of the Commission's Regulations Governing Television Broad-
casting, Television Satellite Stations Review of Policy and Rules, Report & Order, 14 
F.C.C.R. 12,903, 12,947 (1999). Meanwhile, the cross-ownership limitations on a newspaper 
owning a radio or television station remain in place for the time being. In re Amendment 
of Sections 73.34, 73.240, & 73.636 of the Commission's Rules Relating to Multiple Owner-
ship of Standard, FM, and Television Broadcasting Stations, Second Report & Order, 
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cable and traditional broadcasting, which many originally saw as com-
petitors in the marketplace of ideas. Additionally, a second stage is set 
for the future consolidation of television networks themselves. On 
April 19, 2001, the FCC announced that it had amended its dual net-
work rule to permit anyone of the four major television networks-
ABC, CBS, Fox, and NBC-to own and control any emerging net-
work, such as UPN and WB.71 A parallel drive toward consolidation is 
also occurring at the local station level. Effective November 16, 1999, 
the FCC revised its duopoly rule to permit any entity to own, operate, 
or control two television stations licensed in the same designated 
market area under certain conditions.72 
The FCC safeguards of the fairness doctrine, the political edito-
rial rules, and the personal attack rule were designed to ensure that 
viewpoint diversity had some minimal respect in the monopolistic set-
ting of the mass media. The Supreme Court in Red Lion Broadcasting 
Company v. F.c.c. upheld the right of the FCC to adopt by regulation 
the fairness doctrine and its derivative political editorial rules and 
personal attack rule. 73 The decision was based on the language and 
legislative history of the Federal Communications Act, which, since 
1927, required broadcasters to operate in the "public interest."74 The 
fairness doctrine generally required broadcasters to devote a reason-
able amount of time to the discussion of controversial issues by pro-
viding fair coverage of opposing positions. When a federal court of 
appeals stated that the fairness doctrine was not codified in the 1959 
amendments to the Federal Communications Act, the FCC re-
evaluated its fairness doctrine regulation and concluded that the doc-
trine contravened the First Amendment and disserved the public in-
terest.75 
Docket No.18ll0, 50 F.C.C. 2d 1046, 1075 (1975). However, the FCC is considering the 
revision of even this limitation. See generally In re Cross Ownership of Broadcast Stations 
and Newspapers, 66 Fed. Reg. 50991 (proposed Oct. 5, 2001) (to be codified at 47 C.F.R. 
pt. 73). 
71 Press Release, FCC, FCC Eliminates the Major Network/Emerging Network Merger 
Prohibition from Dual Network Rule, 2001 FCC LEXIS 2165, at *1 (Apr. 19, 2001). 
72 In re Kentuckiana Broad., Inc. & Independence Television Co., 16 F.C.C.R. 6974, 
6974 n.l (2001). 
73 See 395 U.S. 367, 380 (1969). 
74Id. 
75 Telecomm. Research & Action Ctr. v. F.C.C., 801 F.2d 501, 505 (D.C. Cir. 1986). 
Based on an extensive hearing, the FCC concluded that the fairness doctrine did not serve 
the public interest, but the agency did not definitively resolve the doctrine's constitutional-
ity and continued to enforce the agency doctrine because of uncertainty as to whether the 
doctrine had been codified by federal statute. In re Inquiry into Section 73.190 of the 
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The derivative political editorial rules and political attack rules 
thereafter lived on borrowed time. The FCC abandoned the fairness 
doctrine in favor of a deregulated electronic media industry at a time 
when the industry was becoming increasingly centralized. The politi-
cal editorial rules provided that when a broadcaster endorsed or op-
posed a legally qualified political candidate, the broadcaster had to 
notify the other candidates and give them a reasonable chance to re-
spond.76 The personal attack rule, of particular importance to those 
countering racial and group defamation, provided that if in the 
course of broadcasting a controversial issue an attack was made "upon 
the honesty, character, integrity or like personal qualities of an 
identified person or group," the broadcaster had to notify the person 
or group attacked no later than a week after the attack, provide a 
transcript of the attack or accurate summary if not available, and offer 
a reasonable opportunity to respond over the broadcaster's facility.77 
The personal attack rule provided extremely limited protection 
to groups alleging attacks based on race or ethnicity. Infrequent and 
insubstantial racial slurs were not enough to deny a television broad-
cast license.78 Even where the Polish American Congress properly 
processed a substantial complaint, both on fairness and personal-
attack grounds, through the FCC procedures, a federal appellate 
court found the personal attack rule unavailable to the Polish-
American community, despite a series of "Polish jokes" told on the 
Commission's Rules and Regulations Concerning General Fairness Doctrine Obligations 
of Broadcast Licensees, Report, 102 F.C.C.2d 145, 147, 155 (1985). In Meredith Corp. v. 
RC.C., the federal appellate court ordered the FCC to re-evaluate both the constitutional 
and public policy bases for the doctrine. 809 F.2d 863, 874 (D.C. Cir. 1987). In Syracuse 
Peace Council against Television Station WTVH, Syracuse, NY, the FCC found that the fairness 
doctrine chilled speech and disserved the public interest, even though the FCC admitted 
that broadcasting still had an allocational scarcity of more applicants for stations than 
spectrum space available. Memorandum Opinion & Order, 2 F.C.C.R. 5043, 5054-55 
(1987). The federal appellate court upheld the repeal of the fairness doctrine as within 
the FCC's authority without reaching any constitutional issues. Syracuse Peace Council v. 
F.C.C., 867 F.2d 654, 655-56 (D.C. Cir. 1989). 
76 Red Lion Broad. Co., 395 U.S. at 373-74. The political editorial rules were later 
codified in 47 C.F.R. § 73.1930 (1981). 
77 Red Lion Broad. Co., 395 U.S. at 373-74. The personal attack rule was later codified 
in 47 C.F.R. § 73.1920 (1981). 
78 Nat'l Ass'n for Better Broad. v. F.C.C., 591 F.2d 812, 820 (D.C. Cir. 1978). The allied 
fairness doctrine did not provide for monetary recovery based on group libel. Provisional 
Gov't of the Republic of New Mrika v. ABC, 609 F. Supp. 104, 108 (D.D.C. 1985). A fairness 
doctrine claim could not be raised in federal court until administrative remedies had been 
exhausted. Mich. United Conservation Clubs v. CBS News, 485 F. Supp.893, 903 (W.D. 
Mich. 1980) (group libel claim). 
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Dick Cavett show sponsored by the ABC network. The appellate court 
concluded that, since no controversial issue of public importance ex-
isted, neither the fairness doctrine nor its corollary, the personal at-
tack rule, could be invoked.79 A federal appellate court finally disman-
tled the personal attack rule by granting a mandamus against the FCC 
to compel repeal of both the personal attack rule and the political 
editorial rules. Instead of deciding the merits of the rules or whether 
they even violated the First Amendmen t, the court negated the rules 
for the simple reason that the FCC had unreasonably delayed its own 
decision for over two decades.80 Without such rules, the Supreme 
Court has made it clear that no one has a constitutional or statutory 
right of access to a broadcast station and that the electronic media are 
not common carriers required to broadcast contrary views.81 
IV. THE FAILURE OF CIVIL ACTIONS FOR GROUP DEFAMATION 
Those who attempt to use the civil law of defamation to recover 
damages for group defamation based on race or ethnicity encounter 
an enormous doctrinal barrier. Generally, defamation of a large 
group is almost never actionable, either by the group itself or by any 
individual within the group.82 What constitutes a "large" group, as dis-
tinct from a "small" one, is uncertain.83 The larger the group, the less 
79 Polish Am. Cong. v. F.C.C., 520 F.2d 1248, 1256 (7th Cir. 1975). The Seventh Circuit 
has historically taken a dim view of the fairness principle. See Radio Television News Dirs. 
Ass'n v. United States, 400 F.2d 1002, 1020 (7th Cir. 1968) (prematurely concluding that 
the First Amendment precluded political editorial rules and the personal attack rule in a 
pre-Red Lion decision). 
80 Radio-Television News Dirs. Ass'n v. F.C.C., 229 F.3d 269, 272 (D.C. Cir. 2000). 
81 See Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 110-11 
(1973). 
82 See DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 406 (2000). "Thus far, any civil remedy for 
such broadside defamation has been lacking." W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEE-
TON ON 'IHE LAw OF TORTS § III (5th ed. 1984). 
II! Alexis v. District of Columbia, 77 F. Supp. 2d 35, 41 (D.D.C. 1999). One perceptive 
decision summarizes well the untidy "rules of thumb" that often divide "large" from 
"small": 
[d. 
In short, the cases surveyed from other federal and state jurisdictions do not 
establish a "bright line" above which a defamed group is "too big" for an un-
named individual member to sue for defamation. The cases do evince a con-
sistent rule of thumb, however, that unnamed group members generally are 
not permitted to sue for group defamation if the group has more than 25 
members; they will almost invariably not be permitted to sue if the group has 
more than 100 members. 
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likely it is that the individual plaintiff can establish that he or she was 
identified personally by the group defamation. One writer has flatly 
stated that a member of a political party, a race of people, or other 
large group that has been defamed will not be able to establish the 
individual identification necessary for personal defamation.84 This 
leads to a legal paradox: the more expansive the defamation, the 
more likely it is that the defamer will totally escape any civil liability. 
The perverse lesson to the would-be defamer is to defame largely.85 
Possibly to mitigate the relativistic notions of "large" and "small," 
the Restatement (Second) of Torts arguably creates more confusion be-
cause it keeps the concepts of "large" and "small" groups, but does 
not require that this distinction be absolutely determinative. The Re-
statement (Second) of Torts § 564A provides: 
One who publishes defamatory matter concerning a group 
or class of persons is subject to liability to an individual 
member of it, but only if, 
(a) the group or class is so small that the matter can rea-
sonably be understood to refer to the member, or 
(b) the circumstances of publication reasonably give rise 
to the conclusion that there is a particular reference to the 
member.86 
84 WILLIAM E. FRANCOIS, MASS MEDIA LAW AND REGULATION 105 (5th ed. 1990) (of-
fering criminal libel as a possible solution to the doctrinal barrier of group size). 
85 At least one court appears to have extended the notion of group libel to a product 
disparagement claim brought as a class action by 4,700 Washington state apple growers 
against the CBS television program 60 Minutes for airing a program alleging that a growth 
chemical used on the apples was a carcinogen. Auvil v. CBS 60 Minutes, 800 F. Supp.928, 
930-31,936 (E.D. Wash. 1992) ("Blindly applying the concept [group defamation limita-
tion] to all disparagement cases, however, would be tantamount to counseling potential 
disparagors [sic] that they are home free if only they succeed in wreaking damage on a 
sufficient number of manufacturers."). The expansive nature of group libel has also served 
to protect actors acting under color of state law in federal civil rights actions. For example, 
at least one court has used the group defamation concept to bar a lawsuit against defen-
dants in a federal civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Sacco v. Pataki, 114 F. 
Supp.2d 264, 265, 271 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). Qualified privilege applied to civil rights lawsuits 
because pre-1997 group defamation precedents raised serious doubt as to whether an un-
named individual had a right to sue for group defamation, even if a listener could find out 
the group members' identities. Alexis, 77 F. Supp. 2d at 44, 46. 
86 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 564A (1977). A standard tort treatise seems to 
juggle the specificity of the statement with the size of the group: (1) defamation generally 
disparaging an entire group; (2) a more specific defamation about a "rather definite num-
ber of persons"; and (3) defamation involving only some members of a "relatively small 
group." KEETON ET AL., supra note 82, § 111; see also Action Auto Glass v. Auto Glass Spe-
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In commentary, the Restatement (Second) of Torts acknowledges the 
impossibility of setting a definite limit between a "large" and "small" 
class or group but then notes that cases rermitting a plaintiffs recov-
ery involved "numbers of 25 or fewer. "8 The result is a type of self-
fulfilling prophecy because most authorities now rather rigidly agree 
the group must consist of twen7-five or fewer members in order for a 
member of the group to sue.8 Sometimes the group is considered 
small, but it is not clear exactly how many members were in the small 
group.89 Other times courts have tweaked the "small" group rule a bit 
by extending it to thirty members.90 At the other extreme, a defama-
tion action brought by more than one million American cattle farm-
ers against television talk-show host Oprah Winfrey, exceeded the 
cialists, No. 1:00-CV-756, 2001 WL 1699205, at *10 (W.D. Mich. Aug. 21, 2001) (issue of 
whether group defamation referred to plaintiff was left to jury). 
87 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 564A cmt. b (1977). 
88 N.Y Life Ins. Co. Agents' Class Claimants Solicitation Litig., 92 F. Supp. 2d 564, 569 
(E.D. La. 1997) (stating that "most authorities" require a group of twenty-five or fewer 
members); see Gintert v. Howard Publ'ns, Inc., 565 F. Supp.829, 833, 839-40 (N.D. Ind. 
1983) (upholding ruling finding no cause of action for group defamation involving more 
than twenty-five persons); Thomas v.Jacksonville Television, Inc., 699 So. 2d 800, 805 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 1997) (holding that a defamatory reference to plaintiff is not possible if 
defamed group is over twenty-five persons); see also Lins v. Evening News Ass'n, 342 N.W.2d 
573, 578 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983) (finding seven group members a small enough group). 
Sometimes, however, courts have found a group too large, even though it contained fewer 
than twenty-five persons. See, e.g., Bujol v. Ward, 778 So. 2d 1175, 1180 (La. Ct. App. 2001) 
(finding twenty-three members of a street crimes unit of forty-six persons who were alleg-
edly defamed too large a group); Coker v. Sundquist, No. 01AOl-9806-BC-00318, 1998 WL 
736655, at *2-4 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 23, 1998) (three named group members insufficient 
to state defamation claim as to one of the three who was adjudged libel-proof anyway be-
cause of his "Death Row" status). At least one court has found groups of persons under 
twenty-five too large when the group consists of public officials, for fear of violating the 
constitutional rule of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, which prevents government from suing 
for defamation in the guise of a group of public officials who do the suing. See Dean Jr. v. 
Town of Elkton, No. CLOO-1958, 2001 WL 184223, at *5 (Va. Cir. Ct. Feb. 21, 2001) (five to 
eight police officers of Elkton Police Department could not sue because of New York Times. 
even though the group was small). See generally New York Times Co. v. Sullivan. 376 U.S. 
254 (1964). 
89See• e.g., Holtzscheiter v. Thomson Newspapers, Inc., 506 S.E.2d 497. 514 (S.C. 1998) 
("family" considered a small group); Hoffman v. Roberto, 85 B.R. 406. 412 (W.D. Mich. 
1987) (size of "relatively small group" was unclear). Sometimes the reverse occurs; a court 
considers a group too large without giving exact numbers. See Price v. Viking Press, Inc .• 
625 F. Supp.641, 645-46 (D. Minn. 1985) (even though as few as ten assigned special 
agents formed part of group, judicial notice was taken that the number of agents "ex-
ceeded the number typically assigned" to bar the lawsuit). 
90 Alexis, 77 F. Supp.2d at 41 ("The courts traditionally have required quite a small 
group-no more than twenty or thirty members-before they will hold that defamation of 
the group should be deemed to have particular application to a group member who is not 
named in the defamatory remarks. ") . 
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unusually generous 740-person line of demarcation between a "large" 
and "small" group set by the Texas courts.91 The only hope for a 
member of an obviously large group is to claim that he or she is a 
member of an identifiable small subset within the large groUp.92 In 
the classic case of Neiman-Marcus v. Lait, a group of 382 saleswomen 
was too large to permit anyone of the saleswomen to sue, even 
though the entire class may have been defamed.93 
Ultimately though, the decisive factor under the Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Torts is not the size of the group, but whether the group defa-
mation reasonably implicates the individual plaintiff. Usually the very 
nature ofa small group means that a defamatory statement as to all or 
fewer can reasonably apply to the plaintiff member, such as a defama-
tory statement that all but one person out of a group of twenty-five are 
thieves. This is not, however, always inevitable. For example, a defama-
tory statement that one out of a group of twenty-five has stolen an 
automobile may not sufficiently defame any particular member of the 
group under the Restatement (Second) of Torts test.94 Conversely, it is 
possible for even a member of a so-called large group to sue in an un-
usual situation. The statement, "All lawyers are shysters," may be de-
famatory as to an individual lawyer if the words are published when 
the lawyer is the only lawyer present and the context indicates the 
speaker is making a personal reference to that lawyer.95 
91 Tex. BeefGroupv. Winfrey, 11 F. Supp. 2d 858,860,864 (N.D. Tex. 1998), affd, 201 
F.3d 680 (5th Cir. 2000). 
92 See Weatherhead v. Globe Int'l, Inc., 832 F.2d 1226, 1228-29 (lOth Cir. 1987) (class 
of 955 dog breeders was too large and was also not an identifiable small subset within the 
class of "dog breeding farms") . 
95 13 F.R.D. 311, 313, 315-16 (S.D.N.V. 1952) However, fifteen salesmen out of twenty-
five suing on their own behalf and on behalf of the others was a small enough group for a 
lawsuit, even though only "most" were referred to in a defamatory manner. The dispute 
revolved around 382 saleswoman who were accused of prostitution and "most" of the 
twenty-five salesmen whom defendant termed "fairies." Defendant apparently conceded 
that nine Neiman-Marcus models had a cause of action for his assertion that "some Nei-
man models are call girls." Id. at 313, 316 n.l; see MICHAEL F. MAYER, WHAT You SHOULD 
KNow ABOUT LIBEL & SLANDER 104 (1968) (criticizing the ruling of Neiman-Marcus v. 
Lait). 
!If RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 564A cmt. c (1977); see Chapman v. Byrd, 475 
S.E.2d 734, 737 (N.C. Ct. App.1996) (alleged defamation referring to "someone" in a 
group of nine insufficient). A member of a group has no claim for defamation aimed at 
some or less than all of the group if there is nothing to single out the plaintiff. Evans v. 
Dolcefino, 986 S.W.2d 69,77 (Tex. Ct. App. 1999). 
95 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 564A cmt. d (1977). H the plaintiff is not part 
ofa "small" group under § 564A (a), then subsection (b) is to be used for a "large" group. 
Bolanin v. Guam Publ'ns, Inc., 4 N. Mar. I. 176, 184 (N. Mar. I. 1994); see Gintert v. Howard 
Publ'ns, Inc., 565 F. Supp. 829,835 (N.D. Ind. 1983); see also Provisional Gov't of the Re-
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This is small solace to a member of an ethnic or racial group, 
which by any definition is large. One can imagine, for instance, a 
situation in which an Albanian is the only known Albanian present 
and a speaker looks at the Albanian from a few feet away and says, "All 
Albanians are horse thieves." Even then, any recovery by the individ-
ual plaintiff Albanian is only for personal damage; it does nothing to 
protect the group reputation of all Albanians. Further, if the "all" is 
reduced to "some" or "most," even this rarefied hypothetical of link-
age between the group and individual plaintiff most likely fails.96 Al-
though there may be a different legal result for an unnamed individ-
ual circumstantially harmed by the vilification of the group to which 
the individual belongs (who may not recover), as opposed to an un-
named but circumstantially identifiable individual who is defamed 
personally (who may recover), the question is ultimately one of cir-
cumstantial degree rather than bright-line rules. The problem is the 
same: do the circumstances reasonably identify the plaintiff as a target 
of the defamation?97 The repeated use of the word "reasonably" in 
both subsections (a) and (b) of Restatement (Second) § 564 A is a verbal 
clue that "smallness" or "largeness" of a group is but a matter of cir-
cumstantial degree rather than the stuff from which black-letter rules 
are made.98 
public of New Mrika v. ABC, Inc., 609 F. Supp. 104, 108 (D.D.C. 1985) (actionability of a 
lawsuit depends on a defamatory statement reasonably applicable to the plaintiff). 
96 Conceivably, the defamation of racial slurs made toward an Mrican-American 
worker in the workplace could become individualized actionable defamation through 
"group defamation" if the worker was the only member of the racial group present when 
the statement was made or if the words are reasonably understood to refer to the worker, 
but the worker lost the claim on other grounds. L & D of Or., Inc. v. Am. States Ins. Co., 14 
P.3d 617, 620 (Or. Ct. App. 2000) (alleged defamatory statements included: "big, black 
and round like your d-k," "nigger work," "being asked what's long and hard on a black 
man and being told the answer was the 'second grade,'" and similar racist and derogatory 
jokes and comments). 
97 Church of Scientology v. Flynn, 744 F.2d 694, 697 n.5 (9th Cir. 1984). "This ap-
proach [of the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 564A(b) (1977)] is not analytically different 
from our conclusion that the group libel rule does not apply." [d. Compare Gintert v. How-
ard Publ'n, Inc., 565 F. Supp. 829,832-33,837 (N.D. Ind. 1983) (prohibiting a member of 
a large defamed group from suing for that defamation under the Indiana non-group rule 
"unless he can show special application of the defamatory matter to himself") , with RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 564A(b) (prohibiting the same thing unless "the circum-
stances of publication reasonably give rise to the conclusion that there is a particular refer-
ence to the member"). Aside from seman tic parsing, what is the practical difference? 
98 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 564A(b) (1977). In Eyal v. Helen Broadcasting 
Corp., the owner of a corporation and the corporation itself, which operated a delicatessen 
in Brookline, Massachusetts, sued for a media defamation when the defendant reported 
that "the owner of a Brookline [d]elicatessen and seven other people [were] arrested in 
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A minority view, called the "intensity of suspicion" test, de-
emphasizes the size of the group at least marginally more than the 
majority view of the Restatement (Second).99 This minority view empha-
sizes the extent to which a group defamation focuses on each individ-
ual member of the group, whether large or small. Oklahoma pio-
neered the "intensity of suspicion" test in Fawcett Publications Inc. v. 
Morris. loo In Fawcett, a well-known plaintiffwas an alternate fullback on 
the University of Oklahoma football team, which consisted of sixty or 
seventy persons. Without reference to any individual team member, 
the defendant published an article claiming that the entire Oklahoma 
football team took illegal drugs. Since the plain tiff was "well known 
and identified" with the group, the court found no reason why the 
size of the group alone should be conclusive. 
The Oklahoma Supreme Court later held in McCullough v. Cities 
Service Co. that the "intensity of suspicion" test uses group size as only 
one factor to be considered along with others, such as the promi-
nence of the group and the prominence of the individual within the 
connection with an international cocaine ring." 583 N.E.2d 228, 229 (Mass. 1991). Because 
the reference was to only one unnamed delicatessen owner and not to a group, the Su-
preme Judicial Court of Massachusetts disagreed with the trial court's view that the owner's 
claim was one of group defamation. Id. at 230 n.6. Thus, the order dismissing the com-
plaint was reversed. Id. at 223. Apparendy it was unimportant how many delicatessens op-
erated in Brookline or that other media oudets had referred to operation of the cocaine 
ring by an "Israeli Mafia." See id. at 229 n.5; cf. Auvil v. CBS 60 Minutes, 800 F. Supp. 928, 
936 n.5 (E.D. Wash. 1992). In Auvil v. CBS 60 Minutes, the court posed the following hypo-
thetical: if pineapples instead of apples had been the subject of the derogatory statement, 
the public would suspect the producer as Dole Pineapple Co. because of its extensive mar-
ket share. Id. Thus, Dole would be able to sue, despite the prohibition against group defa-
mation. See id. Further, the court expressed uncertainty over this hypothetical outcome 
when the Washington apple growers would not be able to sue because of the group prob-
lem.ld. 
99 O'Brien v. Williamson Daily News, 735 F. Supp. 218, 223 n.4 (E.D. Ky. 1990) (The 
three factors of the "intensity of suspicion" test are definiteness and composition of the 
group, the prominence of the group, and the prominence of each individual member 
within the group.). The Restatement (Second) test has been referred to as the "so-called 'ma-
jorityrule.'" McCullough v. Cities Serv. Co., 676 P.2d 833, 836 (Okla. 1984). 
100 See 377 P.2d 42, 48 (Okla. 1962). The Oklahoma Supreme Court distinguished early 
Anglo-American cases, which had confused group criminal defamation with civil cases. See 
id. at 51 (group size alone inconclusive of liability). The court cited a Canadian appellate 
precedent that allowed a Jewish plaintiff in Quebec, home to seventy-five Jewish families 
out of a city population of 80,000, to sue in defamation for the entire Jewish group, even 
though only the group was defamed and not the plaintiff individually. Id. at 51. This "in-
tensity of suspicion" test has been called the "true" test in which group size is not control-
ling. Brock v. Thompson, 948 P.2d 279, 292 (Okla. 1997). Accord Gaylord Entrn't Co. v. 
Thompson, 958 P.2d 128, 147 (Okla. 1998). 
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group. 101 Therefore, an alleged defamation of some 19,686 osteopaths 
in the United States failed the "intensity of suspicion" test as to a 
claim brought by one Doctor of Osteopathy among many.t02 The 
Court explained that the action failed the "intensity of suspicion" test 
on the ground that impersonal reproach of an indeterminate class, 
such as 19,686 Doctors of Osteopathy, is not actionable because the 
larger the group libeled, the less likely a reader would take the libel to 
refer to a particular individual. Furthermore, the justices concluded 
that frank discussions of matters of public concern are protected by 
the First Amendment, and thus, incidental or occasional injury to a 
person resulting from defamation to a large group is offset by the 
public's right to know.103 This indicates that, although size alone is not 
controlling under the "intensity of suspicion" test, it can be the critical 
factor that leads to the same non-liability result as the majority view of 
the Restatement (Second) of Torts. The New York judiciary adopted this 
Oklahoma minority test in Brady v. Ottaway Newspapers, Inc. 104 While 
agreeing that group size is not controlling, the court added further 
balancing factors, including the definiteness of the group in composi-
tion and number and its degree of organization. The New York judi-
ciary has acknowledged, however, that ~roup variations are too great 
for an exclusive list of balancing factors. 05 
In reality, the difference between the majority Restatement (Second) 
test and the minority "intensity of suspicions" test is simply a matter of 
degree. Neither test makes size controlling. Yet neither excludes size 
from consideration, even though the Restatement (Second) test appears 
to make the difference between "small" and "large" groups more 
significant. A New York court of review concluded that under the Re-
statement (Second) test, a member of a large group can only sue if there 
is a "special allusion to a particular member of the group or the cir-
cumstances surrounding publication give rise to the inference that 
there is a particular reference to a specific individual. "106 The refer-
ence under the majority test is to the individual plaintiff under the 
101 676 P.2d 833, 837 (Okla. 1984). 
102 [d. 
108 [d. at 836-37. 
I~ 445 N.Y.S.2d 786, 793 (App. Div. 1981). Twenty-seven un indicted city police officers 
out of fifty-three in 1972 could sue for defamation of un indicted officers. [d. at 787,794. 
105 [d. at 793. The plaintiff's success in Brady occurred because of key factors regarding 
the group: it was limited to un indicted officers, was a highly visible group into which entry 
was limited, and was a locally prominent group easily identified by the public. Houbigant, 
Inc., 182 B.R. 958, 975 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1995). 
106 Brady, 445 N.Y.S.2d at 793. 
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guise of an attack on the group, and thus no need exists to ask 
whether the "intensity of suspicion" focuses on the individual plaintiff. 
Even though the minority view seems more favorable to plain tiffs, the 
difference is scant. The differences resemble mere quibbles about the 
relevant strength of circumstantial evidence needed to justify a refer-
ence to an individual plaintiff, as well as the importance of group size 
as one of those circumstantial factors. 
The importance of policy in determining whether group defama-
tion should be allowed is illustrated by Auvil v. CBS 60 Minutes, a class 
action for a product disparagement claim brought on behalf of 4700 
Washington apple growers as the result of a 60 Minutes program that 
implied that red apples across the United States were tainted with a 
carcinogen.I07 The federal court acknowledged that the group defa-
mation doctrine, possibly applicable to the product disparagement 
case, was justified by two reasons: (1) dilution and (2) lack of plain-
tiff's identification. If a class is sufficiently large, no one person in the 
group suffers personal injury because the injury is diluted. 
Even though this made sense in a defamation case, the court 
paradoxically concluded that, where "pecuniary interests" are at stake 
in a product disparagement case, no dilution exists. lOS Somehow the 
court saw intangible defamation harm as different from tangible 
product disparagement harm, even though a group of 4700 is large by 
any standard. As for the absence of a specifically identifiable plaintiff, 
the court theorized that when defamation of an entire large group 
occurs, the defamation cannot reasonably be taken to include each 
member of the group.I09 Yet, again the Washington court suggested 
the lack of a specifically identifiable plaintiff was more of a problem 
in the defamation of a large group rather than in a trade disparage-
ment of a product, such as apples, involving a large group, such as 
Washington apple growers. The moral seems to be that when courts 
consider group defamation based on race or ethnicity at least as 
harmful as the Washington court considered the trade disparagemen t 
of red apples, the law of group defamation will likely change. 
Neither the so-called majority Restatement (Second) test nor the "in-
tensity of suspicion" minority test is useful to a plain tiff of a particular 
racial or ethnic group who sues on the basis of group defamation. 
The Prosser treatise acknowledges that even though group defama-
107 See 800 F. Supp. 928, 930-31 (E.D. Wash. 1992). 
108 Id. at 935. 
109 Id. at 936. 
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tion has been a "fertile and dangerous weapon of attack" on racial, 
religious, and political minorities, so far a civil remedy for "broadside 
defamation" does not exist. 110 A class action brought on behalf of over 
600 million Muslims for defamation to recover damages for the show-
ing of the film Death oj a Princess was not actionable. lll Even with the 
benefit of the presumably more liberal "intensity of suspicion" test, a 
Nigerian was not allowed to bring a defamation action against CBS for 
damages on his own behalf and on behalf of more than five hundred 
Nigerians engaged in international business with the United States. l12 
Apparently only one federal case has intriguingly suggested in dictum 
that group defamation might exist in Illinois. This case, dealing with 
"Polish jokes" in the film Flashdance, stated that if the defamation 
could be said with certainty to include every member of the group, a 
cause of action would lie for group defamation because a stereotypical 
Polish-American who is the butt of "Polish ~okes" may be said to rep-
resent every individual in the ethnic group. 13 
One treatise writer suggests that group defamation is disfavored 
because "much group abuse is meaningless invective. "114 But obviously 
much non-group defamation is also meaningless invective that does 
not meet the definition of defamation. ll5 Neither proposition logi-
cally excludes, however, the harmful defamation of either a group or 
an individual where meaningless invective is not involved. The 
difficulty with a too facile dismissal of racial and ethnic group defama-
tion is more than just the opportunity for demagogues to induce a 
population to adopt defamatory attitudes toward a disfavored or sub-
ordinate group, as the treatise writer himself concedes. Rather, the 
difficulty lies with the assumption that the marketplace-of-ideas meta-
phor functions in the mass media in the same way that it functions in 
the public square, where all citizens have equal access. Accordingly, 
the usual reasons given for not allowing a civil action for group defa-
mation are questionable at best. 
110 KEETON ET AL., supra note 82, § 111. 
III Khalid Abullah Tariq AI Mansour Faissal Fahd AI Talal v. Fanning, 506 F. Supp. 186, 
186 (N.D. Cal. 1980). 
112 Anyanwu v. CBS, 887 F. Supp. 690, 691, 693 (S.D.N.Y. 1995). 
lIS Pawelek v. Paramount Studios Corp., 571 F. Supp. 1082, 1084, 1085 n.9 (N.D. Ill. 
1983) (complaint dismissed on other grounds) (citing Brewer v. Hearst Pub. Co., 185 F.2d 
846, 848-49 (7th Cir. 1950); McGuire v. Jankiewicz, 290 N.E.2d 675, 676 (Ill. App. Ct. 
1972». 
114 DOBBS, supra note 82, § 406, at 1137. 
115 ld. § 403, at 1130 ("Beyond ridicule and name-calling, many assertions can cause 
harm to the plaintiff's reputation but are not defamatory."). 
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One concern is that any kind of group defamation action will set 
loose an unacceptable flood of litigation. ll6 The fear that lawsuits for 
defamation of a racial or ethnic group will open the floodgates of liti-
gation is pure speculation. A North Dakota statute provides that if a 
defamation is uttered as to "an entire group or class of agricultural 
producers or products," a cause of action for damages, actual and ex-
emplary, in addition to injunctive relief, arises in favor of each pro-
ducer in the group and any association representing an agricultural 
producer, "regardless of the size of the group or class."117 No 
floodgate of litigation appears to have opened in North Dakota or in 
any other state with a similar law.1lS The technique of class actions 
removes the fear that a large number of plaintiffs will automatically 
create insurmountable procedural difficulties. ll9 
116 See Mich. United Conservation Clubs v. CBS News, 485 F. Supp. 893, 900 (W.D. 
Mich. 1980). "Statements about a religious, ethnic, or political group could invite thou-
sands of lawsuits from disgruntled members of these groups claiming that the portrayal 
was inaccurate and thus libelous." ld. In that case, an organization of hunters and several 
of its members, who belonged to a group of more than one million hunters, could not sue 
as a matter of law for defamation of Michigan hunters because, under the Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Torts § 564A, the only way for a group member to sue is "if the circumstances sur-
rounding publication give rise to the conclusion that the member was being focused on." 
ld. at 899. 
117 N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-44-03 (1997). Undoubtedly, a two-year statute of limitation 
helps prevent a floodgate of litigation. See id. § 32-44-04. A similar Texas statute was found 
inapplicable in Texas Beef Group v. Winfrey, 11 F. Supp.2d 858, 862-63 (N.D. Tex. 1998), 
affd, 201 F.3d 680, 687 (5th Cir. 2000) (Texas statute passed in 1995 on heels of Alar apple 
scare). These "veggie libel laws" allow all producers of a general food to sue if the food is 
wrongly said to be dangerous. DOBBS, supra note 82, § 406, at 1136-37. 
118 Besides North Dakota, one authority has found some eleven states with statutes re-
lating to agricultural food product disparagement. Megan W. Semple, Thggie Libel Meets Free 
Speech: A Constitutional Analysis of Agricultural Disparagement Laws, 15 VA. ENV'IL. LJ. 403, 
404 n.13 (1995-1996). Some of these substantially expand the group of potential parties 
who can sue by defining "producer" to include the whole market chain from grower down 
to consumer. ld. at 413. No reported cases dealing specifically with these laws, however, are 
noted. See id. The author of this Article has found no cases decided under the North Da-
kota statute mentioned. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-44-03. 
119 See, e.g., Wilkinson v. Fed. Bureau of Investigation, 99 F.R.D. 148, 156 (C.D. Cal. 
1983) (finding that a class action against officers and agencies of the federal government 
was the "superior method" of litigating false stigmatization claims, which were "closely 
analogous" to group defamation claims). Neiman-Marcus v. Lait, 13 F.R.D. 311, 317 
(S.D.N.Y. 1952) (holding that a "spurious" class suit is appropriate where "there are com-
mon questions of law and fact affecting the several rights of members of the 'spurious' 
class and common relief is sought against the defendants"). If a defendant were to defame 
thousands of Irish-Americans in a city by picking likely Irish-American names out of a tele-
phone book and personally defaming each person by reason of their Irish ancestry, the law 
has no concern about a floodgate of litigation because each plaintiff is named. Yet the 
same potential for mass litigation exists as though it were a group defamation case. The 
Supreme Court has indicated that group defamation is not an automatic defense to a civil 
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The law already permits group defamation actions in a covert 
fashion. Corporations, partnerships, and even unincorporated asso-
ciations, as long as they have legal capacity to sue as an entity, may sue 
for defamation without regard to whether they are "large" or "small" 
in terms of capitalization or number of shareholders.12o The reality is 
that the legal entity's officers, employees, and shareholders all benefit 
if the legal entity prevails in the lawsuit, even though they cannot di-
rectly sue for defamation to the legal entity.l2l A not-for-profit corpo-
ration of Mrican-Americans, having thousands of members in a state, 
can be defamed and can sue for that defamation, but if those same 
Mrican-Americans are merely a large group, they cannot sue for 
group defamation, either as a group or as members of the group. It is 
curious, to say the least, that one corporation may sue for defamation 
to itself, though it has a huge number of employees and shareholders, 
but that a group of corporations, more than twenty-five and defamed 
as a corporate group, is not allowed to sue. The group of corporations 
is too large a group under the Restatement (Second) majority test even 
though the individual corporations may hypothetically be sole or fam-
ily corporations with only a few shareholders underneath the corpo-
rate veils. 
The problem with defamation suits based on race or ethnicity is 
not the common view that the defamation fails to cause generalized 
harm to the group or specifically to all persons within the group. The 
Supreme Court in Beauharnais v. Illinois acknowledged that prejudice 
based on race could affect the social prospects of all members within 
the group.122 Rather, the fundamental problem with these suits, and 
one not commonly noted, is that the larger the group, the more at-
defamation lawsuit brought by an individual plaintiff from the group. Rosenblatt v. Baer, 
383 U.S. 75, 82 n.6 (1966). 
120 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 561, 562 (1977); see also La Luna Enters. v. 
CBS Corp., 74 F. Supp.2d 384, 387 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (actionable claim by restaurant for 
"Russian mob" assertion); McConathy v. Ungar, 765 So. 2d 1214, 1218 (La. Ct. App. 2000) 
(actionable claim by corporation as a separate legal entity based on Restatement (Second) of 
Torts § 561). Libel of a partnership trade name is considered a libel of all the partners. 
Poorbaugh v. Mullen, 653 P.2d 511, 520 (N.M. Ct. App. 1982). Investors in an unincorpo-
rated business venture cannot directly sue, however, for defamation to the business ven-
ture. AIDS Counseling & Testing Ctrs. v. Group W Television, Inc., 903 F.2d 1000, 1005 
(4th Cir. 1990). 
121 See Auvil v. CBS 60 Minutes, 800 F. Supp. 928,935 (E.D. Wash. 1992). "It would mat-
ter not a whit whether all of the apple orchards in the state were owned by a single corpo-
ration or, as here, by thousands of 'ma and pa' operations. The injury would be the same." 
[d. 
122 Beauharnais v. Dlinois, 343 U.S. 250, 263 (1952). 
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tenuated the chain of causation linking the defamation to specific 
persons within the groUp.12!1 Thus, there is an institutional inability of 
the law to parcel out the damages among members of the defamed 
group in any satisfactory manner. Even if a defamation proximately 
causes harm to a group, the law must still apportion the monetary 
d h 1 · tifr. d' . 1 . . 1 124 amages among t e p am J.s accor mg to some ratlona prmClp e. 
This apportionment problem is compounded by the fact that, 
absent proof of special damages, the typical general per se damages of 
defamation law are intangible concepts of reputation, honor, standing 
in the community, humiliation, and emotional suffering that are 
much harder to put in terms of dollars and cents, let alone apportion 
among members of the defamed group.125 At least where a defendant 
falsely defames all apple growers in the United States by implying that 
they use a carcinogen on the red apples, an individual grower of red 
apples can show loss of profits or other monetary losses.126 But how 
does one calculate, for example, the real but non-economic harm of a 
racial or ethnic community that is unable to elect members of its 
group to office because of a continuous defamatory barrage directed 
against the group? 
There is no reason, moreover, to suppose that the monetarily 
compensable damage to members of a defamed group will be equal. 
A publication that "the Italian-American members of the Democratic 
party in State X are Mafia fellow travelers" could affect two Italian-
Americans quite differently. For example, an Italian-American of 
Democratic persuasion in State X, who is fired because his employer 
read the publication and fired the employee in order to protect the 
company from Mafia fellow travelers, is more harshly affected by the 
publication than a Democratic Italian-American from State X who has 
lived abroad for ten years and plans to do so indefinitely. Further-
more, monetary compensation becomes totally unrealistic when a 
group, like any racial or ethnic group, is somewhat porous and not 
rigidly defined. Members of a racial or ethnic group may not be full-
blooded members of the group or may not consider themselves psy-
chologically members of the group, even if historically murky pedi-
grees could be ascertained with reasonable certainty. Conversely, indi-
128 See Auvi~ 800 F. Supp. at 935-36 (discussing the dilution problem). 
m The determination of whether defendant's act has caused an injury precedes and is 
analytically different from the question of what damages should be compensated. LEON 
GUEN, RATIONALE OF PROXIMATE CAUSE 193 (Rothman Reprints, Inc. 1976) (1927). 
125 See generally DOBBS, supra note 82, § 422; KEETON ET AL., supra note 82, § 116A. 
126 Auvi~ 800 F. Supp. at 930-31. 
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viduals who are not members of the racial or ethnic group by blood 
may consider themselves such by cultural choice. This would inject 
courts into the daunting task of determining whether a particular in-
dividual is properly aligned with a particular race or ethnic group for 
the purpose of receiving his or her apportioned damage. 
Injunctive relief also does not provide a feasible alternative solu-
tion to the insoluble problem of apportioning damages among mem-
bers of the defamed group. Injunctive relief cannot remedy past 
defamation, but only future harm. And even as to intended defama-
tion not yet uttered, the traditional rule of equity, though questioned, 
has been that equity will almost uniformly reject injunctive relief 
against a libel that damages personal reputation.127 Additionally, the 
judiciary in the United States has resoundingly rejected injunctive 
relief in defamation cases as a prior restrain t on the First Amendmen t 
guarantees of free speech and a free press.128 Although some sparse 
authority suggests an injunction might lie against further repetitions 
of a defamation once the plain tiff has secured a jury verdict,129 it ap-
pears that there has been no case in which emergency conditions 
127 HENRY L. MCCLINTOCK, MCCLINTOCK ON EQUITY § 159, at 430 (2d ed. 1948) (Mis-
sourijudicial dicta suggesting injunctive relief against defamation if prior judgment at law 
is uncollectible); accord DOBBS, supra note 82, §§ 402, at 1124, § 422, at 1193-94. Ohio, 
Georgia, and Minnesota have been named as states no longer following the equitable 
maxim that equity will not enjoin a libel. Kramer v. Thompson, 947 F.2d 666, 677 (3d Cir. 
1991). 
128 CBS, Inc. v. Davis, 510 U.S. 1315, 1318 (1994) (civil or criminal proceedings subse-
quent to defamation, rather than prior restraints, ordinarily preferred as more appropriate 
sanctions, even for calculated defamation because of First Amendment considerations). 
Accord Near v. Minn. ex. reL Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 701-02, 722-23 (1931) (rejection of in-
junctive relief, even where defamation is a continuing nuisance and violates a criminal 
statute). "Any system of prior restraints of expression comes to this Court bearing a heavy 
presumption against its constitutional validity." Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 
70 (1963). See Near, 283 U.S. at 701-02,722-23 (striking down a statute that treated a "ma-
licious, scandalous and defamatory newspaper or other periodical" as a public nuisance 
subject to injunction). "It is always difficult to know in advance what an individual will say, 
and the line between legitimate and illegitimate speech is often so finely drawn that the 
risks of freewheeling censorship are formidable." Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Con-
rad, 420 U.S. 546, 558-59 (1975) (presumption against prior restraints heavier and speech 
protection broader than judicial limitations set for criminal penalties affecting speech). 
129 See Kramer v. Thompson, 947 F.2d 666, 676 (3d Cir. 1991), vacated IIy 947 F.2d 935 
(3d Cir. 1991) (four Missouri cases cited for dicta that injunctive relief is permissible to 
prevent further publication once prior jury verdict has been obtained). The Supreme 
Court has also warned that it has never held that all injunctions against the press would 
violate the First Amendment. Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Rela-
tions, 413 U.S. 376, 390 (1973) ("The special vice ofa prior restraint is that communica-
tion will be suppressed, either directly or by inducing excessive caution in the speaker, 
before an adequate determination that it is un protected by the First Amendmen t. ") . 
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were ever found sufficient to justify injunctive relief against a threat-
ened defamation not yet published. 
In the final analysis, the traditional remedies of damages or in-
junctive relief for group defamation are totally unworkable from 
theoretical and practical standpoints. It would indeed be strange for a 
system of monetary compensation, which has been so strongly ques-
tioned when only an individual sues for non-group defamation, to be 
less defective when group defamation is at issue. And injunctive relief, 
which is effectively barred by the combined prohibitions of equity 
tradition and constitutional prior restraint doctrine in cases of indi-
vidual non-group defamation, becomes no more tenable if group 
defamation is involved. In sum, civil law group defamation has re-
mained a harm without a workable remedy. 
V. CRIMINAL DEFAMATION STATUTES 
Criminal defamation statutes avoid the intractable problem of 
allocating monetary recovery according to the harm caused each 
member of the group in a civil defamation action. By use of the 
criminal law, society punishes antisocial conduct without the necessity 
of compensating for harm to the victim. As AIDA discovered in its 
lawsuit, the Individual Dignity Clause of Article I, Section 20 of the 
Bill of Rights in the lllinois Constitution is based on a former lllinois 
criminal statute that made it unlawful to manufacture, publish, ex-
hibit, or distribute in any public place any "lithograph, moving pic-
ture, play, drama or sketch" that portrayed "depravity, criminality, un-
chastity or lack of virtue of a class of citizens, of any race, color, creed, 
or religion" and that exposed those citizens to "contempt, derision, or 
obloquy or which is productive of breach of the peace or riots ... 130 
The landmark case of Beauharnais v. Illinois upheld the constitu-
tionality of this former lllinois statute in a 5-4 decision, when the 
statute was used to impose a $200 criminal fine on Beauharnais, the 
president of the racist White Circle League, who had passed out bun-
dles of leaflets to League members for distribution at Chicago's down-
town street corners.I31 The leaflets set forth a petition calling on city 
officials to halt the Negro invasion of white persons and their neigh-
borhoods. The Supreme Court noted a key phrase in the leaflet, 
which asserted that the "rapes, robberies, knives, guns and marijuana 
130 ILL. REv. STAT. ch.38 § 471 (1949); DAVID R. MILLER, 1970 ILLINOIS CONSTI'IUTION 
ANNOTATED FOR LEGISLA'IDRS 17, 115 n.195 (4th ed. 1996). 
181 343 U.S. 250, 266-67 (1952). 
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of the negro" would surely unite the white race.132 No actual violence 
or bodily injury was charged or proved in relation to the distribution 
of the pamphlets. 
In upholding the conviction, the Supreme Court rejected the 
argument that this criminal libel statute violated the First Amendment 
speech and press protections implicit in the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. The specific issue was whether a criminal 
libel statute could constitutionally be used to protect racial groups.l!I3 
In answering affirmatively, Justice Frankfurter, writing for the Court, 
observed that, not only was libel a common law crime and punishable 
in the American colonies, but that, at the time of the Beauharnais de-
cision, every American jurisdiction had a criminal libel statute.I34 His 
opinion also reasoned that, even though it was not completely clear to 
what degree these statutes extended beyond individual libel to crimi-
nal group libel, it would be "arrant dogmatism" for the Court to sec-
ond-guess the Illinois legislature's policy determination that a per-
son's job, educational opportunities, and other social benefits may 
depend as much on the reputation of the racial group to which the 
person accidentally belongs as on the person's own merits. Thus, 
speech punishable if directed at an individual also logically could be 
punishable if directed at the racial group with which a person is inex-
tricably connected. 135 
Following Beauharnais, however, the Seventh Circuit Court of 
Appeals in Collin v. Smith upheld the First Amendment right of neo-
Nazis to march in Skokie, Illinois, a village with a large Jewish popula-
tion, including several thousand Holocaust survivors.136 The appellate 
court interpreted "the rationale" of Beauharnais to mean that the 
criminal libel statute in that case, which was substantially the same as 
the Skokie village ordinance, turned for its validity "quite plainly on 
the strong tendency of the prohibited utterances to cause violence 
and disorder. "137 Because the village did not urge the possibility of a 
violent reaction to the neo-Nazi march, the group libel ordinance was 
1S2 Id. at 251-52. "No one will gainsay that it is libelous falsely to charge another with 
being a rapist, robber, carrier of knives and guns, and user of marijuana." Id. at 257-58. 
155 See id. at 258, 266. 
154 Id. at 254-55. 
155 Id. at 263. 
1S6 578 F.2d 1197, 1207 (7th eir. 1978). 
157 Id. at 1204. 
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not strong enough to act as an exception to the First Amendment 
rights of the neo-Nazis.138 
This interpretation is questionable because it ignores aspects of 
the Beauharnais opinion that indicate criminal libel is punishable in 
itself, without the necessity of a violent reaction.139 Furthermore, the 
Collin view runs counter to the well-researched case of State v. Browne, 
which established that, although early common law criminal libel 
cases depended on a concomitant breach of the peace, this was not 
true of later criminal libel law development.140 Instead, the Collin 
court relied on the 1925 Dlinois Supreme Court opinion of People v. 
Spielman, cited in Beauharnais, wherein the Dlinois Supreme Court 
had actually interpreted a different Dlinois criminal libel statute from 
the one involved in Beauharnais. Furthermore, when the Dlinois Su-
preme Court in Spielman noted in passing that "[c]riminalliability for 
libels rests upon their tendency to provoke breaches of the r,eace," it 
cited early common law cases and not the later development. 41 In any 
1!18 See id. at 1204-05. 
189 See Beauharnais, 343 U.S. at 266. The Beauharnais majority rejected use of the clear-
and-present danger test, which would be expected had a tendency toward violence been a 
constitutional necessity for the criminal libel statute. [d. The defendant was allowed to 
offer evidence on the truth of the charges, which would have been irrelevant if fear of 
social unrest had the dominant concern, just as it had been in the early days of common 
law libel. See id. at 253-54. Most importantly, the case went to the jury as a libel case, 
whether or not the words threatened violence or breach of the peace. [d. at 253. Even the 
text of the criminal libel statute under which the case was tried was worded in the disjunc-
tive ("contempt, obloquy or derision or which is productive of breach of the peace or ri-
ots."). ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38 § 471 (1949). The Beauharnais majority cited Chaplinsky v. 
New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942), for the separate delineation ofthe categori-
cal exceptions to the First Amendment: "the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, 
and the insulting or 'fighting words'-those which by their very utterance inflict injury or 
tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace." [d. at 256. 
[d. 
140 206 A.2d 591, 595 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1965). Browne states that: 
While recognizing the common law breach-of-the-peace theory, the courts 
have not required a factual showing of violence; either actual or potential. In 
most modern criminal libel statutes that element is omitted, thereby indicat-
ing that such legislation is not solely designed to prevent violence. The trend 
is away from considering a threatened breach of the peace as a singular basis 
for criminal prosecution, and it has moved toward placing the emphasis upon 
the tendency of the publication to damage the individual regardless of its ef-
fect upon the public. 
U1 149 N.E. 466, 469 (1925), cited in Beauharnais, 343 U.S. at 254 n.3, further cited with-
out name in Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197, 1204 (7th Cir. 1978) (limiting the Beauharnais 
holding to cases where the criminal libel has a strong tendency to provoke a violent reac-
tion). "[S]uch a libel is punishable even though its application to individual members of 
the class or group cannot be proved." [d. 
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event, the Spielman observation was more likely intended as a truism 
of general public policy than as an essential statutory or constitutional 
requirement, which would inject an element of uncertainty into every 
libel case. A "tendency" to provoke a breach of the peace is not the 
same as an indispensable element of a crime. 
To make the constitutional validity of a criminal libel statute de-
pend on the "heckler's veto" leads to the unacceptable result that any 
group of rowdies can turn an otherwise unconstitutional application 
of a criminal defamation statute into a constitutional application for 
the protection of the group reputation, provided only that the group 
protests loudly and violently enough.142 Recent decisions have dis-
missed the yardstick of the "heckler's veto" as the measure of a law's 
constitutionality.143 IT the Collin view is ultimately correct, however, 
then the usefulness of criminal libel statutes is hobbled at the outset 
because of the difficulty in ascertaining how much clairvoyance of a 
violen t reaction the First Amendmen t requires. 
Criminal defamation statutes are faced with a dilemma. IT they 
are not designed to protect against a violent reaction to the defama-
tion uttered, they may be struck down as a violation of the First 
Amendment by those courts that follow the Collin approach of limit-
ing the defamation exception to the First Amendment, with the over-
lay of a historically separate "fighting words" exception. On the other 
hand, if a criminal defamation statute explicitly incorporates protec-
tion against public disorder or breaches of the peace, it runs the high 
risk of violating the First Amendment by an unconstitutionally vague 
standard as to what constitutes public disorder, breach of the peace, 
or similar generic crime. In Ashton v. Kentucky, the Supreme Court 
struck down a Kentucky criminal libel statute that prohibited "any 
writing calculated to create disturbances of the peace" because the 
142 The "heckler's veto" concept in First Amendment jurisprudence is the ability of an 
audience hostile to the speaker's message to stop the speech, either by violence or threat 
of violence against the speaker. The Supreme Court has severely limited, if not entirely 
abolished, the "heckler's veto" over unwanted speech. See LEE C. BOLLINGER, ThE TOLER-
ANT SOCIE'IY 183-84 (1986). 
148 See, e.g., Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 134-35 (1992) 
(finding it improper to base administrative costs for demonstrations on the degree of hos-
tile listeners' reaction to the demonstration); accomTerminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1,4-5 
(1949) (speech protected by First Amendment even if causing unrest, social dissatisfaction, 
anger, or public dispute); Chicago Acorn v. Metro. Pier & Exposition Auth., 150 F.3d 695, 
701 (7th Cir. 1998) (finding it improper to waive administrative fees for established politi-
cians and parties, because such a policy would be a form of the "heckler's veto"); Collins v. 
Chicago Park Dist., 460 F.2d 746, 754 (7th Cir. 1972) (clearly improper to consider possi-
bility of a hostile audience as a factor in denying permit for a public demonstration) . 
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statute vaguely required a defendant to calculate the emotional reac-
tions of an audience to which the libel was addressed.144 To follow the 
Collin approach is likely to place criminal defamation statute in a no-
win position where it will either be struck down because it was not de-
signed to protect public tranquility or because it was so designed but 
is inherently vague in its design. 
Aside from the cloud cast by the view that a criminal defamation 
exception to the First Amendment can only be justified if combined 
with another historically separate "fighting words" exception, tradi-
tional criminal defamation statutes must also meet the constitutional 
requirement of "actual malice" established in New York Times Co. v. Sul-
livan.145 "Actual malice" denotes knowledge of the defamatory falsity 
or reckless disregard for whether the statement was true or false. 146 In 
such cases, the truth of the defamatory words is absolutely protected 
under the First Amendment without any qualifications, such as those 
requiring the uttering of truth for good motives and justifiable ends. 
147 Thus, even a criminal libel statute that simply refers to a defen-
dant's "malicious intent" is both overbroad because it permits the 
prosecution of speech protected by New York Times actual malice and 
inherently vague because it creates a potential confusion between 
common law "malice" and New York Times "actual malice" definition.148 
144 384 U.S. 195,200 (1966) "This kind of criminal libel 'makes a man a criminal sim-
ply because his neighbors have no self-control and cannot refrain from violence.'" ZECHA-
RIAH CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH IN TIlE UNITED STATES 151 (1954), cited in id.; accord Williams 
v. State, 295 S.E.2d 305, 306 (Ga. 1982) (libel limited to that which "tends to provoke 
breach of the peace" unconstitutionally vague); Boydstun v. State, 249 So. 2d 411, 413-14 
(Miss. 1971) (statute punishing publication of a "libel" without statutory definition and no 
case precedent since 1910 unconstitutionally vague). But see People v. Henrich, 470 N.E.2d 
966,970 (Ill. 1984), appeal dismissed/or want ofjurisdiction, 471 U.S. 1011 (1985) (holding a 
communication "which tends to provoke a breach of the peace" constitutional because 
legislative history showed phrase limited to "fighting words"). 
145 See generally 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
146 Id. at 279-80; accord Fitts v. Kolb, 779 F. Supp. 1502, 1514 (D.S.C. HI91); Ivy v. State, 
821 So. 2d 937, 946 (Ala. 2001); Weston v. State, 528 S.W.2d 412, 415 (Ark. 1975); Eberle v. 
Mun. Court for Los Angeles Judicial Dist., 127 Cal. Rptr. 594, 597-98 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976); 
State v. Browne, 206 A.2d 591, 598 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1965); Madison v. Thnker, 589 
P.2d 126, 131 (Mont. 1978); see Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 77-78 (1964); see also 
Moity v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 201, 209 (1964). Sometimes a court will save a criminal defa-
mation statute by construing it to incorporate New York Times actual malice. See Phelps v. 
Hamilton, 59 F.3d 1058, 1070-71 (10th Cir. 1995), revg828 F. Supp.831 (D. Kan. 1993); 
People v. Ryan, 806 P.2d 935, 938-39, 940 (Colo. 1991). 
147 See State v. Helfrich, 922 P.2d 1159, 1161 (Mont. 1996) (citing precedent indicating 
that the "vast majority" of courts refuse to judicially narrow qualified-truth statutory de-
fenses to save them from constitutional invalidity). 
148 Fitts, 779 F. Supp. at 1515-16. 
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Several cases have gone beyond the New York Times "actual mal-
ice" limitation, however, to find group defamation of public officials 
absolutely protected by the First Amendment.149 Because impersonal 
criticism of government in general is often intermeshed with group 
defamation of public officials, some group defamation of public 
officials is absolutely protected by the First Amendment. To allow the 
group defamation action under such circumstances would open "a 
back door to official censorship. "150 Even if a group defamation of 
public officials can be disentangled from a protected criticism of gov-
ernment in general, such public officials, as well as all public figures 
who are the victims of a defamatory attack must at least still establish 
"actual malice" for liability. 
Some authority stops here and refuses to hold that a criminal 
defamation statute invoked to punish the defamation of private per-
sons, who are neither public officials nor public figures, must also re-
quire proof of New York Times actual malice. l5l Under this view, a 
truthful statement, if uttered without good motives or justifiable ends, 
can still amount to criminal defamation as long as it involves the 
defamation of a private person who is neither a public official nor a 
public figure. 152 Other authority has taken a bolder path, however, 
beyond the clear holdings of Supreme Court precedent, by deciding 
that the First Amendment prohibits a conviction of criminal libel for 
defamation uttered in public without New York Times actual malice on 
a matter of public concern, even if the victim is a private person.153 
This more expansive view is based on the premise that, because Gertz 
v. Robert Welch, Inc. precludes private plaintiffs who are involved in a 
matter of public concern from recovering punitive damages without 
149 See Dean v. Town of Elkton, No. 11958,2001 WI.. 184223, at *5 (Va. Cir. Ct. Feb. 21, 
2001). "It would appear after this holding in New York Times v. Sullivan that the 'small 
group theory' cannot be constitutionally utilized to prove the 'of and concerning' element 
of a defamation action if the defamatory statement is directed at a government or gov-
ernmental agency, no matter what its size." Id.; see also Andrews v. Stallings, 892 P.2d 611, 
617 (N.M. Ct. App.1995), citing Saenz v. Morris, 746 P.2d 159, 163 (N.M. Ct. App.1987) 
(holding that impersonal criticism of government is not libel of government official). 
150 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-12, at 863 (2d ed. 
1988). 
151 See Ryan, 806 P.2d at 940-41; People v. Heinrich, 470 N.E.2d 966, 972 (Ill. 1984). 
152 See Heinrich, 470 N.E.2d at 972. 
153 See State v. Powell, 839 P.2d 139, 145 (N.M Ct. App. 1992). Some of the authorities 
supporting this view are pre-Gertz cases, which cite the earlier view of Rosenbloom v. 
Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 42-43 (1971), that the First Amendment requires proof of 
New York Times actual malice on all public issues and events of general interest, regardless 
of the plaintiff's status. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Armao, 286 A.2d 626, 629-30 (Pa. 
1972). 
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proof of New York Times actual malice, analogous reasoning should 
apply to private-person victims of a criminal defamation, because be-
tween punitive damages and criminal fines, both chill First Amend-
ment rightS. I54 Since Garrison, the Supreme Court has declined to re-
solve this Split. I55 
Constitutionally under attack at the fringes, criminal libel statutes 
are also under attack as broadly unconstitutional due to the void-for-
vagueness doctrine. Application of the doctrine, especially potent in 
matters involving criminal statutes and the First Amendment, strongly 
suggests that the common law and statutory definitions of defamation 
are incapable of reasonably informing citizens of what is prohibited 
and encourage arbitrary enforcement of the law. In Tollett v. United 
States, a federal appellate court struck down as unconstitutional a fed-
eral statute that punished the mailing of any "libelous, scurrilous, de-
famatory, and threatening" matter on the outside of envelopes or on 
postcards.I56 Aside from a barrage of criticisms directed to a lack of 
clarity in the statute concerning its application to private libel, the 
truth defense, the role of "malice," the role of fault, and whether and 
to what extent a "breach of the peace" was required, the appellate 
court observed that the "Act [did] not in any way attempt an objective 
definition of 'libelous' and 'defamatory.'"157 The appellate court in 
Tollett cited approvingly Ashton for Justice Douglas' broad dictum that 
the English common law of criminal libel was inconsisten t with consti-
tutional principles and too indefinite and uncertain for enforcement 
as a criminal offense. I58 In addition, the court in Tollett found the gov-
ernmental interests supporting the statute insufficient, including the 
argument that criminal libel laws usefully supplement civil libel laws 
154 Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 350 (1974). Presumably, these courts 
would not constitutionally extend New York Times actual malice to private persons not in-
volved in a matter of public concern because in a civil defamation context the Supreme 
Court has refused to hold that the First Amendment requires such a purely private plain-
tiff to prove New York Times actual malice in order to recover punitive damages. See generally 
Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749 (1985). 
155 379 U.S. at 72 n.8 (stating, "We recognize that different interests may be involved 
where purely private libels, totally unrelated to public affairs, are concerned; therefore, 
nothing we say today is to be taken as intimating any views as to the impact of the constitu-
tional guaran tees in the discrete area of purely private libels. "). 
156 485 F.2d 1087, 1096 (8th Cir. 1973). The court concluded that, unlike in other con-
texts, it was merging the concepts of vagueness and overbreadth in striking down the stat-
ute because the statute dealt with a First Amendment activity. Id. at 1096 n.22. 
157 Id. at 1097. 
158 Id. at 1097, citing Ashton v. Kentucky, 384 U.S. 195, 198 (1966). 
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by protecting the dignity of the individual. 159 Another court, which 
reached the same result, found that, although this federal criminal 
statute might rationally deter potential defamers who would not be 
frightened of a civil law judgment, this reasoning still did not satisfY 
the compelling governmental interest required by the First Amend-
ment. 160 
The Alaska Supreme Court has reached much the same conclu-
sion. Alaska had a misdemeanor criminal defamation statute that pun-
ished the willful publication of "defamatory or scandalous matter" 
concerning another with "intent to defame." In Gottschalk v. State, the 
statute was applied against a citizen who had accused a state trooper 
of having taken money from the citizen's vehicle.161 The Supreme 
Court in Gottschalk, besides reversing the prosecution on narrower 
grounds, took the broader position found in Ashton and Tollett that the 
concept of defamation was inherently vague. Mter noting that the 
statute did not define what was "defamatory" or "scandalous," the Su-
preme Court turned to the common law definition, which it also 
found lacking in sufficient precision.162 The Supreme Court was 
influenced by Dean Leflar's study, in which Leflar found that nearly 
half of all criminal defamation cases brought between 1920 and 1955 
were basically political in that they were filed against unsuccessful po-
litical candidates, the candidate's supporters, or against private citi-
zens who had offended those who were politically powerful. 163 
Even though the Supreme Court has never overruled Beauhar-
nais, the continued validity of that case remains in considerable doubt 
because of basic changes in the law of defamation relating to freedom 
of expression.164 The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has 
ld. 
159 1bllett, 485 F.2d at 1095-96. 
160 United States v. Handler, 383 F. Supp. 1267, 1278 (D. Md. 1974). 
161 575 P.2d 289, 289-90 (Alaska 1978). 
1621d. at 292. The court stated: 
What is defamatory or scandalous is not defined in ASl1.15.310; therefore, 
the common law definition must be relied on. At common law, any statement 
which would tend to disgrace or degrade another, to hold him up to public 
hatred, contempt or ridicule, or to cause him to be shunned or avoided was 
considered defamatory. In our view this falls far short of the reasonable preci-
sion necessary to define criminal conduct. 
16S ld. at 294. The Alaska Supreme Court left open the possibility that a narrowly 
drawn statute with more precise definitions related to breach of the peace might be up-
held. ld. at 295. 
164 See Dworkin v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 867 F.2d 1188, 1200 (9th Cir. 1989). 
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concluded that Beauharnais is no longer good law.165 A number of 
other cases have also questioned the current validity of Beauharnais.l66 
Yet the United States Supreme Court has in at least two cases assumed 
the continued vitality of Beauharnais.167 
Whatever the remaining constitutional validity of Beauharnais, a 
more fundamental reason remains for the inefficacy of criminal 
defamation law as a remedy for group defamation based on race or 
ethnicity. Since Beauharnais, the trend of legislation and public policy 
has moved decisively against the continuation of criminal defamation 
statutes. The Beauharnais opinion noted that, at the time of that deci-
sion, everyone of the then forty-eight states, the District of Columbia, 
Alaska, Hawaii, and Puerto Rico punished criminal libels of individu-
als. l68 Furthermore, some of these statutes were even used to punish 
group libel.l69 To the extent Beauharnais relied on this unbroken pat-
tern of support for criminal libel laws, the reliance as constitutional 
authority has been gravely undermined by subsequent events. At the 
time of this Article, the author could only find nineteen states that 
still had some form of criminal libel or criminal defamation, either by 
statute or common law.170 Nevada was not included because, even 
1611 Am. Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323, 331 n.3 (7th Cir. 1985) ("In Collin v. 
Smith, [we] concluded that cases such as New York Times v. Sullivan had so washed away the 
foundation of Beauharnais that it could not be considered authoritative.") (citation omit-
ted). Accord Dworkin, 867 F.2d at 1200 ("We agree with the Seventh Circuit that the permis-
sibility of group libel claims is highly questionable at best. "). 
166 Sambo's Rests., Inc. v. City of Ann Arbor, 663 F.2d 686, 694 n.7 (6th Cir. 1981) (cit-
ing cases questioning Beauharnais). 
167 See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 763 (1982) ("Leaving aside the special consid-
erations when public officials are the target, New York TImes Co. v. Sullivan, a libelous publi-
cation is not protected by the Constitution. Beauharnais v. Illinois")(citations omitted). In 
R.A. V. v. City of St. Pau4 the Court cited Beauharnais as an example of a traditional limita-
tion on freedom of speech. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 383 (1992) ("We have 
recognized that 'freedom of speech' referred to by the First Amendment does not include 
a freedom to disregard these traditional limitations. "). 
168 Beauharnais, 343 U.S. at 255. Eight states punished criminal libel by common law; 
twelve made statutory "libel" a crime without defining the term. The remaining jurisdic-
tions used the common law definition in their statutes. Ill. at 255 n.5. Even as late as Tollett 
v. United States, which struck down a federal libel statute as unconstitutionally vague, the 
federal appellate court conceded that most states had some type of criminal libel statute. 
485 F.2d 1087,1088,1094 (8th Cir. 1973). 
169 See Beauharnais, 343 U.S. at 258. 
170 (1) COLO. REv. STAT. § 18-13-105 (2002). This statute survived constitutional chal-
lenge in People v. Ryan, 806 P.2d 935, 941 (Colo. 1991); (2) FLA. STAT. ch. 836.01 (2002); 
(3) GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-39 (1999). In State v. Linakis, the statute's applicability was 
limited to defamatory remarks with the direct tendency to cause acts of violence by the 
person to whom defamation is addressed. 425 S.E.2d 665, 670 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992); (4) 
IDAHO CODE §§ 18-4801 to -4809 (1997); (5) KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-2004 (1995). This 
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though it has a criminal libel statute, no one has ever been prose-
cuted under the statute, and in an unpublished order, the United 
States District Court approved an ar,;eement by the parties that the 
Nevada statute was unconstitutional. 71 Of those nineteen states, Ken-
tucky's statute is limited to defamation actions brought by judges 
against those who defame the judiciary in the course of its duties.172 
Moreover, several of those nineteen states have statutes or common 
law that have been invoked minimally or sometimes not at all since 
the nineteenth or early twentieth centuries.I73 Others have only lim-
ited criminal defamation statutes targeted to specialized problems 
without general application.174 The irony is that Illinois has repealed 
not only the group criminal libel statute upheld by the Supreme 
Court in Beauharnais but also a general criminal defamation statute.175 
statute survived constitutional challenge in Phelps v. Hamilton, 59 F.3d 1058, 1061 (lOth Cir. 
1996); (6) Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 432.280 (1999) (limiting criminal defamation to libel or 
slander of a judge); (7) MASS. GEN. LAws ch. 272, § 98C (2000); (8) MICH. COMPo LAws 
§§ 750.97, 750.389 (West 2002) (regarding false statements about financial condition of 
certain financial institutions; § 750.370 (regarding attribution of crime, infamous or de-
grading act, or unchastity of a female); (9) MINN. STAT. §§ 609.77, 609.765 (2002); (10) 
MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-8-212 (2001); (11) N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 644:11 (1996); (12) 
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-47 (2002); (13) N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-15-01 (1997); (14) OKLA. 
STAT. tit. 21, §§ 777-781 (2003); (15) 'TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-13-214 (1997) (apparently 
basing indictment for criminal libel on common law criminal libel); (16) UTAH CODE ANN. 
§ 76-9-404 (1999); (17) WASH. REv. CODE §§ 9.58.010 to -.020 (2003); (18) State V. Clif-
ford, 52 S.E. 864 (W. Va. 1906) (reviewing apparent common law criminal defamation 
cause of action); (19) WIS. STAT. § 942.01 (2001-2002). 
171 See NEV. REv. STAT. 200.510 (West 2002); LIBEL DEF. REs. Cn., INC. (LDRC) 50-
STATE SURVEY 2001-2002: CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN MEDIA LIBEL LAw, at Nevada, § I 
(LDRC ed., 2001). 
172 Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 432.280 (1999). 
175 Oklahoma has had only one reported case since 1931. Pegg V. State, 659 P.2d 370, 
372-73 (Okla. Crim. App. 1983) (affirming conviction under "false rumor" statute for 
accusing a person of being a prostitute). Tennessee's last case seems to be Melton V. State, 
22 Tenn. (3 Hum.) 389 (1842). West Virginia's last common law case appears to be State V. 
Clifford, 52 S.E. 981 (W. Va. 1906). 
174 Georgia limits application to threat of direct violence by the subject of the defama-
tion, GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-39 (1999); Kentucky, to defamation of a judge, Ky. REv. 
STAT. ANN. § 432.280 (1999); and Michigan, to various isolated kinds of criminal libel 
situations, MICH. COMPo LAWS §§ 750.97, 750.370, 750.389 (West 2002). See generally Ashton 
V. Kentucky, 384 U.S. 195 (1996) (striking down Kentucky's general criminal libel statute 
on vagueness grounds). 
175 The statute upheld in Beauhamais, ILL. REv. STAT. ch.38 § 471 (1949), was repealed 
on January I, 1962. The separate general criminal defamation statute, 720 ILL. COMPo 
STAT. 5/27-1 (1993), was repealed July 1,1986. The general criminal defamation statute 
had been interpreted to provide sanctions against group defamation as well as individual 
defamation. [d. 
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In addition, what the majority in Beauharnais failed to note was 
the infrequency with which these laws were invoked, even around the 
time of the Beauharnais decision. Professor Robert A. Leflar con-
ducted a study of llO reported criminal defamation cases between 
years 1920 and 1955 in which he found a declining number of cases in 
each ten-year period. Leflar found fifty-eight cases reported in the 
ten-year period of 1920-1929, thirty-four in the twelve-year period of 
1930-1941, and only eighteen in the fourteen years from 1942 
through 1955. Nearly half of all cases were political in the sense that 
they involved public officials or candidates for public office. Only 10 
of the 110 involved group libel, typically involving attacks on religious 
or racial groups, such asJews, Mrican-Americans, or Catholics.176 
In updating Leflar's study from 1956 through 2001, the author of 
this Article found the declining trajectory of prosecutions for criminal 
defamation even more remarkable. The author found sixteen re-
ported cases of criminal defamation from 1956 through 1966, four-
teen cases from 1966 through 1976, a sharp fall-off to five cases from 
1976 through 1986, just one case from 1986 through 1996, and then 
only two cases from 1996 through 2001. Of the total number of thirty-
eight cases reported in the Decennial Digests during this period, only 
one involved racial group libel and twenty-almost two-thirds-were po-
litical in the sense of involving alleged defamatory attacks on political 
candidates or public officials, such as judges, district attorneys, an at-
torney general, a police chief, a sheriff, a presidential candidate, and 
both a senator and a town.177 A hypothesis for this decline since 
Leflar's study is that prosecutors have heeded the cumulative impact 
of Garrison in 1964, Ashton in 1966, and Gertz in 1974 by not bringing 
defamation actions. It is unlikely that public discourse has become 
more courteous and less defamatory in this period. 
176 Robert A Leflar, The Social Utility of the Criminal Law of Defamation, ,34 TEx. L. REv. 
984,985 (1956). Gottschalk v. State, 575 P.2d 289, 294-95 (Ala. 1978) relied substantially on 
the article's findings in striking down Alaska's criminal libel statute. Id. 
177 See Libel & Slander, 2001 ELEVENTH DECENNIAL DIGEST PART I §§ 141-62, at 838; 
Libel & Slander, 1998 TENTH DECENNIAL DIGEST PART II §§ 141-162, at 291-92; Libel & 
Slander, 1992 TENTH DECENNIAL DIGEST PART I §§ 141-162, at 1078-79; Libel & Slander, 
1988 NINTH DECENNIAL DIGEST PART II §§ 141-162, at 1539-40; Libel & Slander, 1983 
NINTH DECENNIAL DIGEST PART I §§ 141-162, at 1645; Libel & Slander, 1978 EIGHTH DE-
CENNIAL DIGEST §§ 141-162, at 1680-82; Libel & Slander, 1968 SEVENTH DECENNIAL DI-
GEST §§ 141-162, at 709-12. Like Professor Leflar, the author based his research on West's 
Decennial Digests. The author used the keynote system by researching under Libel and 
Slander, Criminal Responsibility, §§ 141-162. Like Leflar, the author eliminated duplicate 
citations to the same case and went further by eliminating civil cases and Wisconsin crimi-
nal slander of title cases, which had been misclassified as criminal defamation cases. 
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The Supreme Court has probably doomed criminal defamation 
law, not by a sudden-death thrust of inherent unconstitutionality, but 
rather by the ultimately mortal wounds of New York Times actual malice 
and the void-for-vagueness doctrine. At some point, the Supreme 
Court may constitutionally snuff out criminal defamation altogether 
by invoking the coup-de-grace of reverse-Beauharnais reasoning-
namely that, because so few states have criminal defamation laws and 
because few are effective in those states that do have them, no com-
pelling state interest justifies the consequent prohibition on freedom 
of expression. This is particularly true inasmuch as approximately two-
thirds of the cases decided between 1956 and the present involve po-
litical officials or political candidates who tried to invoke criminal li-
bel law against their opponents. This borders on the criminalization 
of criticism directed toward government. Ever since Sullivan de-
nounced the Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798, which had punished 
defamation against the federal government and federal officials, this 
confusion between government and individual officeholders has been 
considered an unconstitutional abridgement of the First Amend-
ment. I7S 
Criminal libel law, therefore, is a useless and increasingly uncon-
stitutional remedy for the redress of racial or ethnic group defama-
tion. The author has found only one case since 1956 that applied a 
criminal libel statute to protect racial and ethnic groups against scur-
rilous defamation. I79 Criminal defamation is not recognized in the 
Model Penal Code or by a leading criminal law treatise. ISO Even 
though racial and ethnic defamation affect the public weal and not 
178 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 276 (1964). ("Although the Sedition 
Act was never tested in this Court, the attack upon its validity has carried the day in the 
court of history."). New York Times cited City of Chicago v. Trilmne Co., in which the Illinois 
Supreme Court concluded free expression prevented a city, as a governmental entity, from 
suing its citizens for defamation. 139 N.E. 86, 90 (Ill. 1923); see also supra notes 122, 124. 
Professor Leflar noted that public figures, such as Hollywood movie stars, as well as gov-
ernment officials, are apt to use their influence to initiate criminal defamation charges. See 
Leflar, supra note 176, at 985. See generally Eberle v. Mun. Court, 127 Cal. Rptr. 594 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 1976), in which the state unsuccessfully brought criminal libel charges against 
defendants for publishing negative comments about actress Angie Dickinson. 
179 See generally City of Chicago v. Lambert, 197 N.E.2d 448 (Ill. App. Ct. 1964) 
(affirming conviction for distribution of leaflets attributing to Mrican-Americans and Jews 
criminal tendencies, unchastity, and degrading sexual inclinations). 
180 See generally MODEL PENAL CODE (1985); WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR., 
CRIMINAL LAW (2d ed. 1986). Another criminal law treatise writer suggests libel should be 
left to the civil law. ROLLIN M. PERKINS & RONALD N. BOYCE, CRIMINAL LAW 492 (3d ed. 
1982). 
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merely individual interests, the criminal law of libel is no longer effec-
tive to redress that group wrong. 
VI. DECLARATORY RELIEF: A SOLUTION 
There is substantial support for declaratory relief as a general 
solution to the haphazard First Amendment dangers of a traditional 
defamation action for monetary relief. Generally, a declaratory judg-
ment is a traditional remedy that provides an authoritative declaration 
of rights disputed by the parties in cases of actual controversy,181 Any 
such declaration has the full force of law and the effect of a final 
judgment by itself, whether or not a further remedy is sought. The 
Restatement (Second) of Torts discusses a number of advantages that a 
declaratory judgment action has over a traditional damages action for 
defamation.182 Former Supreme Court Justice White expressed the 
view that declaratory relief, with damages banned or curtailed, might 
better serve both First Amendment interests and a plaintiffs interest 
in reputation than an action for damages as limited by the Supreme 
Court in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.183 In Gertz, the Supreme Court held 
that the First Amendment precluded the imposition of defamation 
liability without fault where the defamation defendant is a private in-
dividual.184 Then U.S. Representative Charles Schumer proposed to 
the 99th Congress a bill that would have protected "the constitutional 
right to freedom of speech by establishing a new cause of action for 
defamation," in which a public official or public figure who was the 
subject of a publication or broadcast by print or electronic media may 
sue for a declaratory judgment that such publication was false and 
defamatory. Proof of defendant's state of mind was not required, but, 
on the other hand, no damages were awardable under this action. I85 
181 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (2000); DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES § 2.1 (2), at 53 (2d. ed. 
1993). 
182 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 623 (1977). Declaratory judgment provides a 
judicial vindication of reputation while avoiding the problems of converting harm to repu-
tation into money damages, of the frequent unavailability of any damage remedy, and of 
the chilling speech effect of substantial damages. Id. at 327-28. 
185 Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 771 (1985) 
(White, J., concurring) ("At the very least, the public official should not have been re-
quired to satisfY the actual malice standard where he sought no damages but only to clear 
his name."); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 393 (1974) (White, J., dissenting) 
("I have said before, but it bears repeating, that even if the plaintiff should recover no 
monetary damages he should be able to prevail and have ajudgment that the publication 
is false. ") . 
184 See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 347,349-50. 
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The Libel Reform Project of the Annenberg Washington Program 
also recommended a declaratory judgment action for any defamation 
lawsuit as an alternative option to a lawsuit for damages. Under this 
declaratory approach the defendant's state of mind was also not an 
elemen t of proof.186 
Furthermore, the constitutional concern of the Supreme Court 
regarding civil defamation involves the chilling effect of monetary 
dama~es on the First Amendment rights of freedom of speech and 
press. 87 The holdings of New York Times and Gertz, which used First 
Amendment concerns to delimit the traditional law of defamation, 
were related to a traditional action for damages. Declaratory relief, 
however, does not require an ancillary request for damages or injunc-
tive relief, even though oftentimes one of these two alternative reme-
dies is also requested. 188 Unlike other judgments, a judgment of de-
claratory relief is not coercive and does not compel the parties against 
whom it is entered to take or refrain from taking any action. Except 
for this difference, no other exists between a declaratory judgment 
and any other kind ofjudgment.189 Yet, a declaratory judgment differs 
from an advisory opinion in that it is a binding determination on the 
merits and, by reason of res judicata, may preclude re-litigation of the 
same issue.190 
185 H.R. 2846, 99th Congo (1985). The avoidance of the New Yom Times actual malice 
standard makes a plaintiff's case much easier. The empirical evidence indicates that the 
New Yom Times standard has reduced a plaintiff's likelihood of success in a libel case by as 
much as 60%. LARRY J. SABATO, FEEDING FRENZY: How ATTACK JOURNALISM HAS TRANS-
FORMED AMERICAN POLITICS 70 (1991). 
186 LIBEL REFORM PROJECT OF THE ANNENBERG WASH. PROGRAM, PROPOSAL FOR THE 
REFORM OF LIBEL LAw § 4, at 16 (1988). North Dakota has adopted the Uniform Correc-
tion or Clarification of Defamation Act, which provides that a defendant who makes a 
timely and sufficient correction or clarification can only be sued for provable economic 
loss, mitigated by the correction or clarification. N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-43-05 (1996). 
187 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 283 (1964) ("We hold today that the 
Constitution delimits a State's power to award damages for libel in actions brought by pub-
lic officials against critics of their official conduct."). The threat of imprisonment under a 
criminal libel statute is remote. In fact, in New Yom Times, justice Brennan thought that a 
civil defamation action potentially chilled the First Amendment even more than a criminal 
defamation action because of the greater procedural and constitutional safeguards built 
into the criminal law. [d. at 277; see also Gertz, 418 U.S. at 349 (noting the uncontrolled 
discretion of juries in awarding damages, both compensatory and punitive). 
188 DOBBS, supra note 82, § 1.1, at 7. 
189 2 WALTER H. ANDERSON, ACTIONS FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS §457, at 1070 (2d 
ed.1951). 
190 See EDWARD D. RE & JOSEPH R. RE, REMEDIES: CASES AND MATERIALS 347 (5th ed. 
2000). 
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It is probable that the quagmire of New York Times actual malice 
would not be a constitutional requirement of a declaratory action 
brought to determine whether a communication was defamatory at 
law. An action for declaratory judgment is also better than an alterna-
tive variation that would unconstitutionally force a media defendant 
to publish a correction or retraction in its own medium of communi-
cation. l9l Because of First Amendment concerns, the FCC and the 
judiciary have changed course and no longer force an electronic me-
dia defendant to open up a station to outsiders under the fairness 
doctrine, the political attack rule, or the political editorial rules. 192 A 
declaratory action, on the contrary, does not hypothetically trench on 
the First Amendment by forcing a media defendant to publish state-
dictated content in its media communications or to spend its own 
finances to publish a state-dictated retraction. 
A declaratory remedy for racial and ethnic group defamation is 
also attractive because it circumvents the First Amendment objection 
that criminal libel statutes are unconstitutional because they are fa-
cially vague and overbroad.193 The juxtaposition of the First Amend-
ment and the criminal law raises vagueness and overbreadth chal-
lenges to their maximum effectiveness.194 Because a declaratory 
191 A state violates the First Amendment by requiring a newspaper to provide a "right 
of reply" by a political candidate who was attacked by the newspaper. See generally Miami 
Herald Publ'n. Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974) (holding that an intrusion into edito-
rial judgment and control over size and content of the newspaper violates the First 
Amendment). The Supreme Court has not expressly extended the Tornillo doctrine to the 
electronic media and, in fact, distinguished newspapers from cable television in Turner 
Broad. Sys., Inc. v. RC.C., 512 U.S. 622, 656 (1994). 
192 See generally, supra notes 68-75 and accompanying text. The FCC cited Tornillo, 418 
U.S. at 241, in explaining why its fairness doctrine should be abandoned as to broadcast-
ers. In re Inquiry into Section 73.190 of the Commission's Rules and Regulations Concern-
ing General Fairness Doctrine Objections of Broadcast Licensees, Report, 102 F.C.C.2d 
145, 151-52 (1985) (stating that the Tornillo "right of reply" statute is less speech-inhibiting 
than the fairness doctrine); In re Inquiry into Section 73.1910 of the Commission's Rules 
and Regulations Concerning Alternatives to the General Fairness Doctrine Obligations of 
Broadcast Licensees, 2 F.C.C.R. 5272, 5283, 5300 n.87, 5301 n.92 (1987) (arguing that 
increased public access would inject government into day-to-day operations and erode 
editorial discretion). 
19S Laws that inhibit the First Amendment can be facially attacked by the vagueness 
doctrine. City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 55-56 (1999); accord Smith v. Goguen, 
415 U.S. 566, 573 (1974) ("Where a statute's literal scope, unaided by a narrowing state 
court interpretation, is capable of reaching expression sheltered by the First Amendment, 
the [vagueness] doctrine demands a greater degree of specificity than in other contexts."). 
194 When a criminal law implicates the First Amendment, the law must be so clear that 
persons of ordinary intelligence have a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited. 
Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno, 205 F.3d 1130, 1137 (9th Cir. 2000). The other peculiar 
criminal law concern is that a vague law impermissibly delegates basic policy to police 
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judgment action is not a criminal action, however, the vagueness ob-
jection is less stringent.195 It would be startling for the Supreme Court 
to now declare over two hundred years of civil defamation law, which 
has permitted damages, to be unconstitutionally vague, particularly 
when only a declaratory remedy is sought without damages or injunc-
tive relief. 
A declaratory remedy for racial and ethnic group libel may be 
more seriously attacked as improperly chilling freedom of speech and 
the press, such as when government uses a declaratory judgment to 
brand a communication defamatory. The paradox of such a position, 
however, is that it would ban a declaratory judgment without damages 
under the First Amendment, even though the Supreme Court has 
generally refused to invoke the First Amendment to limit civil defama-
tion lawsuits for damages, aside from the Sullivan and Gertz doctrines. 
The Supreme Court has instead indicated that a governmental right 
to speak does not necessarily violate the First Amendment rights of 
those affected by government speech. 
In Meese v. Keene, the Supreme Court upheld the statutory author-
ity of the federal government to label three Canadian films "political 
propaganda" without violating the First Amendment rights of a Cali-
fornia senator who wanted to show the films.196 The Court noted that 
Congress did not by means of the statute prohibit, edit, or restrain the 
distribution or exhibition of the films and left the senator free to 
critically comment on the federal government's action. Conversely, 
the district court's injunction against the government's speech nar-
rowed the marketplace of ideas by eliminating the government's 
views.l97 In Pestrak v. Ohio Elections Commission, a federal appellate 
officers, judges, and juries for resolution on a subjective basis, with the consequent dan-
gers of arbitrary and discriminatory law enforcement. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 
U.S. 104, 108-109 (1972). Vagueness and overbreadth attacks in a First Amendment set-
ting more drastically invalidate on a facial basis, while if done on a Due Process basis, they 
usually invalidate only on an as-applied basis to a specific defendant. KA'IHLEEN M. SULLI-
VAN & GERALD GUN'IHER, CONSTI'IUTIONAL LAw 1299 (14th ed. 2001). 
195 Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, 455 U.S. 489, 498-99 (1982) ("The Court has 
also expressed greater tolerance of enactments with civil rather than criminal penalties 
because the consequences of imprecision are qualitatively less severe."). 
195 481 U.S. 465, 485 (1987); accord Block v. Meese, 793 F.2d 1303, 1313 (D.C. Cir. 
1986) ("We know of no case in which the first amendment has been held to be implicated 
by governmental action consisting of no more than governmental criticism of the speech's 
content."). Every time a court allows a civil defamation judgment for damages against a 
defendant, government is being "critical" of the defendant's defamatory speech. See also 
Richey v. Tyson, 120 F. Supp.2d 1298, 1324-25 (S.D. Ala. 2000) (upholding "political 
committee" statutory label imposed on plaintiffs by government). 
197 Keene, 481 U.S. at 480-82. 
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court upheld an Ohio statute insofar as it allowed a state commission 
to declare the truth or falsity of statements made by candidates during 
an election.198 The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals observed that the 
"truth-declaring" function of the commission was comparable to 
other activities carried on by government, such as federal officials de-
claring the truth or falsity of inflation statistics and the unemploy-
ment rate or U.S. Representatives declaring the truth or falsity of in-
formation in the course of discussing public policy alternatives. l99 
Ever since Milkovich v. Lorain joornal Company, the Supreme Court 
has clearly expressed that opinions, as well as factual assertions, can 
be grounds for defamatory harm without any violation of the First 
Amendment.2OO The only opinions that are protected are those that 
constitute "rhetorical hyperbole" or "imaginative expression" or that 
are based on a complete set of disclosed and true facts so that a 
reader or listener has sufficient information to independently evalu-
ate the credibility of the defendant's opinion inferred from the 
facts. 201 Opinions that imply false statements of fact without stating 
them or that are based on incompletely disclosed facts, however, may 
still be actionable without violating the First Amendmen t. 202 Aside 
from the fact that they involved claims for damages and not declara-
tory relief, earlier defamation cases, which suggest that a civil action 
for group libel might automatically violate the First Amendment, are 
even more broadly undercut by the MilkoviCh decision, so as to permit 
some actions for defamatory opinions.203 
198 926 F.2d 573, 579-80 (6th Cir. 1991). 
199 Id. at 579. 
200 497 U.S. I, 21 (1990). 
201 Id. at 17. 
202 Id. at 18-19. 
203 Khalid Abdullah Tariq al Mansour Faissal Fahd Al Talal v. Fanning, 506 F. 
Supp.186, 187 (N.D. Cal. 1980) ("rr the court were to permit an action to lie for the 
defamation of such a multitudinous group we would render meaningless the rights guar-
anteed by the First Amendment to explore issues of public import."); accord Brady v. Otta-
way Newspapers, Inc. 445 N.Y.S.2d 786, 789 (App. Div. 1981) ("Thus the incidental and 
occasional injury to the individual resulting from the defamation of large groups is bal-
anced against the public's right to know."). Fanning involved a claim for $20 billion on 
behalf of 600 million Muslims, a remedy far more likely to chill First Amendment rights 
than simple declaratory relief. Fanning, 506 F. Supp. at 186-87. Although Milkovich re-
quires that, even for a defamatory opinion a public figure must still prove New Yom Times 
"actual malice" and that a private figure of public concern must prove some level of fault, 
unincorporated racial and ethnic groups who are usually the gratuitous victims of group 
defamation simply cannot reasonably be deemed "public figures," let alone a "private 
figure," even if such cases are not distinguishable on the more basic ground that these 
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A declaratory action for defamation is squarely within a tradi-
tional exception to the First Amendment. Such a declaratory action 
would not affect lawful speech but only defamation-a historically 
recognized exception to the First Amendment. More importantly, the 
action would not prohibit a defendant's speech, regardless of whether 
the speech is considered protected under the Constitution.204 Finally, 
a declaratory judgment action could be drafted to avoid the viewpoint 
discrimination found in the Indianapolis ordinance.205 A declaratory 
approach also effectively circumvents the problematic premises of 
critical race theory that either prohibits racist and bigoted insults as a 
new exception to the First Amendment or provides monetary dam-
ages for a new tort of racial insult. 206 
In the author's role as AIDA co-counsel, one tactical advantage of 
a declaratory judgment action became apparent. By not requesting 
monetary or injunctive relief, a plaintiff assumes the high ground of 
principle over suspected mercenary or censorious motives. With a 
pure declaratory judgment action, the plaintiff is simply trying to cor-
rect the defamatory stereotyping of the racial or ethnic group in the 
public mind. The judiciary has shown some recognition of the fact 
that words and images, unless rebutted, can condition a society to ac-
cept falsity as truth.207 Thus far, the most comprehensive study done 
on the subject of defamation law has found that some plaintiffs see 
themselves as ''winners" by the very act of suing for defamation, even 
though they have little chance of obtaining damages in a traditional 
defamation suit.208 Since groups like AIDA are often more concerned 
about public vindication, they are most likely to use a declaratory 
requirements were designed for defamation cases seeking damages. Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 
9. 
204 Am. Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323,332 (7th Cir. 1985) (striking down 
an Indianapolis ordinance for impermissibly prohibiting protected "pornographic" speech 
that went beyond the "obscenity" exception to the First Amendment because "[tlhe 
definition of 'pornography' is unconstitutional."). 
205 See id. at 331, 332. The Court in Hudnut stated, "We come, finally, to the argument 
that pornography is 'low value' speech, that it is enough like obscenity that Indianapolis 
may prohibit it." Id. at 331. The Court also noted that "the Indianapolis ordinance, unlike 
our hypothetical statute, is not neutral with respect to viewpoint." Id. at 332. 
206 See generally MARl]. MATSUDA ETAL., WORDS THAT WOUND: CRITICAL RACE THEORY, 
AsSAULTIVE SPEECH, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1993). 
207 Hudnut, 771 F.2d at 329 ("Even the truth has Iitde chance unless a statement fits 
within the framework of beliefs that may never have been subjected to rational study."). 
208 RANDALL P. BEZANSON, ET AL. LIBEL LAW AND THE PRESS 78 (1987); see DONALD M. 
GILLMOR, POWER, PUBLICITY, AND THE ABUSE OF LIBEL LAW 11 (1992). 
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remedy, particularly since alternative methods of relief are basically 
illusory. 
Beyond vindication, a declaratory judgment of defamation could 
be used by the racial or ethnic group to counter the social forces that 
feed the defamation. Such declaratory judgments, for example, could 
be used at shareholders' meetings to prevent corporate assets from 
being wasted on defamatory activity. Or they could conceivably be 
used as evidence that a broadcaster has not served the public interest 
when that broadcaster seeks a license renewal. There is even some 
dicta for the view that once a jury has found defamation after a full 
trial, the doctrine of prior restraint does not prevent a court of e~uity 
from enjoining repetitions of the same or similar defamation.2 In 
sum, the declaratory judgment could have practical consequences 
beyond the moral implications of community judgment. 
Furthermore, a declaratory action could still significantly deter 
racial or group defamation, even though it lacks the teeth of money 
damages, injunctive relief, or criminal penalties. Deterrence has never 
been the sole justification of criminal law. In fact, it has always been 
highly questionable as to what extent the death penalty deters murder 
or to what extent the criminal law itself deters crimes of passion, eco-
nomic necessity, or crimes resulting from sociopathic behavior. The 
determination of how any legal norm prevents antisocial conduct 
from occurring eludes scientific certainty. But the utilitarian reality is 
that a declaratory judgment mechanism, like the criminal law, would 
publicly affirm a minimal standard of communal civility - a civic ritual 
of cohesion indispensable to any society, no matter how great or little 
the deterrent effect of the standard. 
CONCLUSION 
In summary, the major nations of the world have recognized that 
racial and ethnic defamation is a harm that requires some form of 
remedy, just as individual defamation is remedied. Unlike these na-
tions, however, the United States has historically accorded freedom of 
speech and press greater weight in balancing the harm to be reme-
died against the infringement on free expression caused by the legal 
remedy. Aside from any constitutional issues, the current civil damage 
lawsuit for defamation is inapplicable because courts have consistently 
denied damages for group defamation by simply refusing to recognize 
209 See, supra note 126 and accompanying text. 
2003] Racial and Ethnic Group Defamation 265 
the individual harm caused by group defamation. Even if courts did 
recognize the harm and award damages, the perplexing problems of 
apportioning class damages among a racial or ethnic group would 
lead to arbitrariness and unworkable complexity. Likewise, criminal 
defamation statutes, whatever constitutional validity Beauharnais may 
still have, are now found in fewer than half of the states in the United 
States. Even in states that have criminal defamation statutes, prosecu-
tors have rarely brought actions within the last thirty years. When ac-
tions have been brought, the alleged victims are usually public 
officials or public figures, rather than powerless private citizens who 
most need the protection of such statutes. 
The solution is to enact a declaratory judgment statute at the 
state level to remedy the specific problem of group defamation based 
on race or ethnicity. The declaratory theory would provide some 
remedy where at present none realistically exists because of constitu-
tional and policy concerns. Such a statute should be carefully crafted 
to avoid any possible collision with the First Amendment and to rem-
edy the most serious wrongs perpetrated by the mass media. The 
floodgate must not be opened so that every trivial charge of backyard 
group defamation streams into the courts. Rather, the statute should 
focus on the most harmful kind of group defamation. Further, the 
action should be controlled by a state official in such a way as to avoid 
any clouded issues of standing in order to bring the declaratory law-
suit. 
The proposal and commentary found in the Appendix are in-
tended to show how a draft of a model statute incorporating these 
principles might look. The proposed statute is a composite of various 
earlier suggestions combined with the thoughts of the author, whose 
major goal was to provide a durable statute that would focus on the 
most serious kind of defamation and that would not be open to frivo-
lous misuse. Of course, the statute could be otherwise expanded or 
modified in the light of experience. If the declaratory action works 
well in the limited area of group defamation based on race and eth-
nicity, it could then be expanded to cover other classes, such as gen-
der or even individual defamation cases, as respected authorities have 
already suggested. Declaratory relief provides a way for the United 
States to join the major nations of the world in asserting communi-
tarian values of minimal decency without abridging its robust heritage 
of free expression and thought. 
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APPENDIX 
"RACIAL AND ETHNIC GROUP DEFAMATION ACT" 
PREAMBLE 
The purpose of this Act is to provide a remedy for a certain kind 
of defamation of unincorporated racial or ethnic groups and the de-
rivative defamation of natural persons within such defamed groups. 
The Act is not intended to replace or modify the civil or criminal law 
relating to the direct defamation of specific and identifiable persons, 
whether natural or artificial, who claim to have been defamed in their 
individual capacity rather than by membership in a racial or ethnic 
group. The Act is to be construed in such a way as to avoid wherever 
possible any conflict with the freedom of speech and press guaranteed 
by either the First Amendment of the United States Constitution or 
the constitution of this state. 
SECTION 1: SCOPE OF COVERAGE 
This Act provides an action and remedy for group defamation 
only insofar as an identifiable racial or ethnic group is the subject of 
the defamation and for no other groups. 
Comment: Because the Act is novel, the goal is to concentrate on 
race and ethnicity, which have a special importance because oj social 
tensions created by an increasingly multicultural society. Once the 
Act takes hold it could be extended to other groups in need oj protec-
tion from other Jorms oj defamation, such as defamation based on 
gender. 
SECTION 2: ACTIONABLE DEFAMATION 
(A) Only defamation, as defined under the law of this jurisdic-
tion, which attributes or imputes criminality to any race or ethnic 
group by virtue of or by reason of the race or ethnicity of the group is 
actionable under this Act. 
Comment: False attribution oj criminal conduct is such a serious 
Jorm oj defamation under traditional law that it has been considered 
deJamation in itself without the need to allege or prove special dam-
ages. In addition, this subclass oj deJamation has a precise meaning 
because criminal conduct is defined by the criminal laws oj the juris-
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diction in which this Act takes effect and by centuries-old precedent 
refining the meaning of this subclass. It is arguably undesirable, 
both for possible constitutional and practical reasons, to extend a 
cause of action to language substantially more vague in content, 
such as "depravity" or "lack of virtue, " as set out, for example, in 
Art. I §20 of the Illinois Constitution (Individual Dignity Clause). 
Given that the voidjor-vagueness doctrine generally has been used 
only in criminal cases or in First Amendment cases involving prohi-
bition or limitation of speech, however, a Jurisdiction might plausibly 
extend coverage to other defamatory statements besides criminal con-
duct. 
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(B) Statements of fact that constitute defamation under Section 2 
(A) of this Act are automatically actionable. 
(C ) Statements of opinion, as defined by the law of this jurisdic-
tion or federal constitutional law, may only constitute defamation un-
der Section 2 (A) if they are based either expressly or implicitly on 
false facts. If they are so based on false facts, defamation may exist 
under this Act even though consideration of the opinion in conjunc-
tion with such facts is necessary to construe a defamatory meaning. If 
they are expressly or implicitly based on true facts, defamation does 
not exist under the Act, whether or not the facts are reasonably 
sufficient to support the opinion. 
(D) Rhetorical hyperbole or pure invective, whether classified as 
fact or opinion, is not actionable. 
(E) Defamation of an individual based on race or ethnicity shall 
not be considered group defamation unless the number of individuals 
defamed is reasonably sufficient to infer an express or implied defa-
mation of the entire race or ethnic group or unless the individual 
defamation, whether based on a real or fictionalized individual, is rea-
sonably construed as a symbolic defamation of the entire race or eth-
nic group. 
Comments: Subsections 2(B), (C), and (D) are based on the con-
stitutional demarcation between actionable defamatory opinions and 
non-actionable defamatory opinions set out by the Supreme Court in 
Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1 (1990). The dis-
tinction should remain because it existed at common law even apart 
from later First Amendment doctrine. See also Hustler Magazine v. 
Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988). Subsection 2(C) would protect re-
searchers, such as Dr. William Shockley, if their controversial or even 
loathsome conclusions or opinions are based on tme facts. As long as 
a third-party reader or listener can evaluate the reasonableness of the 
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conclusion or opinion based on the disclosed true facts, the market-
place of ideas needs no state intervention. Subsection (E) is designed 
to protect against disingenuous attempts to disguise group defama-
tion as individual defamation, such as the symbolic use of "The 
Wandering Jew" to represent all Jews. Yet, most individual defama-
tion will not amount to group defamation, such as the accusation 
that a particular Italian-American is a "Mafia hitman. " 
SECTION 3: PROPER PLAINTIFFS 
(A) The Attorney General of this State is authorized to bring an 
action under this Act. 
(B) The only other party, or parties, authorized to bring an ac-
tion under this Act is a proper representative, or representatives, ex-
pressly selected from the aggrieved racial or ethnic group by the At-
torney General in his or her sole discretion and only if the Attorney 
General expressly relinquishes his or her primary authority to bring 
an action. 
(C) Any representative or representatives selected by the Attor-
ney General pursuant to Section 3 (B) shall have the same standing to 
bring an action under this Act as would the Attorney General. 
Comment: This is based in part on a Massachusetts criminal libel 
statute, which provides that statutory actions for libel based on 
"race, color or religion" are instituted "only Uy the attorney general or 
Uy the district attorney for the district in which the alleged libel was 
published." M.G.L.A. 272 § 98 C. Since the reforms of 1990, 
French law permits certain associations in existence for five years 
and organized to defend the Resistance and concentration camp in-
mates to initiate criminal proceedings involving war crimes, crimes 
against humanity, criminal collaboration, and legal proceedings 
brought against those who deny the Nazi Holocaust against Jews. 
UNDER THE SHADOW OF lW!,'IMAR 47 (Louis Greenspan & 
Cyril Levitt eds., 1993). This Act attempts to combine both ap-
proaches Uy allowing the Attorney General to control the action so as 
to prevent frivolous or borderline claims but also to allow representa-
tives of the affected racial or ethnic group, who would be the most 
motivated, to bring the action. Political realities might also lead an 
Attorney General to turn the action over to designated racial or eth-
nic representatives. 
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SECTION 4: SOLE REMEDY 
(A) The sole and appropriate remedy under this Act shall be an 
action for declaratory judgment, whether or not such a remedy would 
be appropriate under any other law of this state, and no other relief, 
including monetary damages, temporary restraining orders, or in-
junctions either permanent or temporary, shall be awarded. 
(B) Either party shall have the right to a jury, and if such right is 
invoked, the judge shall enter a declaratory judgment in accordance 
with the jury verdict. 
(C) This Act does not abolish or restrict any remedies that might 
otherwise exist under the common law or statutory law of this state. 
Comment: The Restatement (Second) of Torts § 623, the Li-
bel &form Project of the Annenberg Washington Program, H.R. 
2846, 99th Congress (1985), and other reforms in the 1980s offered 
a declaratory approach as an alternative to money damages in a 
civil defamation action, even though they were not concerned with 
group defamation. As for Subsection 4 (B), the predominant view is 
that declaratory actions historically preceded equitable actions and 
are largely governed by statutes in modern times. 1 Walter H. Ander-
son, Actions for Declaratory Judgments, § 1, at 1 ("older than the 
equitable system of jurisprudence"). Thus, no tradition would sug-
gest that a jury not be available. Indeed, the community sense of 
what constitutes a discrediting statement to reputation, whether in-
dividual or group, is particularly suitable for jury resolution. Defa-
mation is one of a few tort actions where England still normally 
permits juries. 37 Halsbury's Laws of England para. 1075 (4th ed. 
Reissue, Butterworth Lexis Nexis 2001)(juries permitted to hear 
claims of fraud, defamation, malicious prosecution, and false im-
prisonment). In case of a bench trial, the judge would, of course, 
need to find defamation before issuing a declaratory judgment. 
SECTION 5: TRUTH 
Substantial truth shall constitute a complete defense to any al-
leged defamation under this Act, but the burden of proving the truth 
of the alleged defamation shall be borne by the defendant. 
Comment: Public officials and public figures who sue for defama-
tion must allege and prove the falsity of the statement. Even private 
plaintiffs who are a subject of public concern must prove falsity. Phi-
ladephia Newspapers v. Hepps, 476 U.S. 767 (1986). Whether 
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or how the Supreme Court would classify a racial or ethnic group 
within these categories of plaintiffs is not completely clear. But this 
constitutional mandate requiring such plaintiffs to prove falsity 
rather than a defendant to prove truth as an affirmative defense 
arose only in the context of a defamation action for money damages 
with a potential chilling of First Amendment rights. Section 5 repre-
sents the traditional common law unaffected by First Amendment 
considerations. 
SECTION 6: STATE OF MIND 
The defendant's state of mind at the time of uttering any defama-
tion under this Act, whether it be with knowledge or reckless disre-
gard of a defamatory statement's falsity or negligence in failing to use 
reasonable care before uttering any defamation or any other state of 
mind, is irrelevant under this Act and shall constitute neither an ele-
ment of a claim nor of a defense. 
Comment: New York Times "actual malice" has spawned exten-
sive litigation. Since this constitutional rule has only been applied to 
defamation lawsuits seeking damages, the disadvantages of the rule 
can be avoided. For example, editors will no longer be forced to reveal 
their internal thought process in depositions seeking to establish "ac-
tual malice" and to that extent will enjoy greater freedom of thought 
and expression. Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153 (1979) (money 
damages). 
SECTION 7: CLASSIFICATION OF DEFAMATION 
The common law categories of defamation per se or defamation 
per quod are abolished insofar as this Act is concerned, and only the 
general meaning of defamation under the common law is to be used. 
Comment: The sometimes bizarre and historically hoary distinc-
tions between defamation per se and defamation per quod, which 
have generated much criticism, would be bypassed. Like the bypass-
ing of New York Times "actual malice, " this will expedite the trial 
of a defamation action under this model statute. The distinctions 
should still be kept in the typical defamation action involving indi-
viduals. 
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SECTION 8: PRIVILEGES 
Any privileges, be they absolute or conditional, that exist under 
the common or statutory law of this state remain as defenses under 
this Act, except that any defense based on the common law of fair 
comment is subject to Section 2 (C) of this Act. 
Comment: Because money damages are not involved under this 
Act, it might be argued that the privileges should not apply. How-
ever, the privileges typically represent social interests that are consid-
ered to offset what otherwise would be a defamatory statement. It 
would seem that these social interests should still be paramount, even 
where only a declaratory judgment is requested. The privilege of fair 
comment has been virtually swallowed up by New York Times v. 
Sullivan, 376 u.s. 254 (1964), Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 
418 U.S. 323 (1974), and their numerous offspring. But given that 
New York Times and Gertz do not apply under this Act, the 
qualified privilege of fair comment may spring back into use. Its use, 
however, is modified in Section 2 (C) as required by Lorain Journal 
Co. v. Milkovich, 497 U.S. 1 (1990) in its constitutional parsing 
of actionable and non-actionable opinions. 
SECTION 9: DEMAND FOR RETRACTION, CORRECTION, OR 
RIGHT OF REPLY 
(A) No action for defamation shall be commenced against any 
defendant unless the complaint alleges that a timely demand for a full 
and fair retraction or a timely demand for a correction or a timely 
demand for a full and fair opportunity to reply on behalf of the af-
fected racial or ethnic group was reasonably made and either refused 
or ignored. 
(B) If a defendant agrees to provide an opportunity to reply to 
the alleged defamation, as provided in Section 9 (A), this agreement 
shall include the right of access to and use of the defendant's facilities 
that were originally used to communicate the alleged defamation to 
the end that the reply may as far as possible reach the same audience 
that heard the alleged defamation, unless the Attorney General or the 
representatives designated by the Attorney General waive this right of 
access and use. 
(C) It is an absolute defense that a defendant has reasonably of-
fered a full and fair opportunity to reply under Section 9 (A) when an 
opportunity to reply has been demanded or has reasonably offered or 
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made the demanded correction or a mutually agreed correction when 
a correction has been demanded. 
(D) It is an absolute defense that a defendant has offered or 
made a full and fair retraction, whether the Plaintiff has demanded 
either a retraction, a correction, or an opportunity to reply. 
Comment: This section is based on the Uniform Correction Or 
Clarification Of Defamation Act and the North Dakota version of 
that Act. N.D. Cent. Code §32-43-05 (1995). By counteracting any 
harm Iry the devices of retraction or correction, litigation can be re-
duced. The right of reply and use of a media defendant's facilities 
avoids the constitutional limitations of Miami Herald Pub. Co. v. 
Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974) because the right to reply would re-
main the choice of the media defendant. This avoids the prohibited 
forced intrusion into editorial judgment and editorial control over 
media publications. See Miami Herald Pub. Co. v. Tornillo, 418 
U.S. 241 (1974). 
SECTION 10: LEGAL ENTmES 
(1) Corporations, partnerships, and all legal entities other than 
natural persons, whether for profit or not-for-profit, shall not be 
deemed a racial or ethnic group, even though the protection of such 
groups may be within their corporate purpose 
(2) Such corporations, partnerships, and all other artificial per-
sons at law retain whatever rights they have under the common or 
statutory law of this state to sue for defamation of the corporate per-
son, and they may be designated as a representative of an affected ra-
cial or ethnic group at the sole discretion of the Attorney General. 
Commen t: This avoids the claim that the Act will protect a single 
legal entity organized for racial or ethnic purposes on the ground 
that, though legally it is one artificial person, it actually represents a 
racial or ethnic group, such as Operation Push or the Polish Na-
tional Alliance. The Act should protect living individuals from the 
indignity and insult of racial or ethnic defamation, whether or not 
they are organized into a legal entity. 
SECTION 11: STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS 
Any cause of action brought under this Act shall be brought 
within one year after the cause of action accrues. 
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Comment: A one-year limitation is common for defamation ac-
tions. The short period is further protection against less meritorious 
claims or evidence impaired try the passage of time. A "discovery 
rule, " which would extend the time for filing to a Period within one 
year after knowledge of the defamation or after knowledge should 
reasonably have been acquired, has been omitted. It is most unlikely 
that a racial or ethnic defamation of any significance would escape 
the attention of the Attorney General, given the numerous interested 
members of a racial or ethnic group who would immediately report 
the defamation to the Attorney General. In any case, the discovery 
rule generally has been confined to medical malpractice cases. 
273 

